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INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Volume III: War and Peace

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INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Volume I: Global political system

Volume II: Political process

Volume III: War and peace

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Introduction

Considerations about international politics represent a discussion beyond personal experience for most people as well as a bit of an exclusive topic for chosen ones. Even the mediated contact can be illusive: watching war on TV resembles a movie, a purchase of imported goods looks like a purchase of domestic products, customs officers follow regulations and the same is done by policemen in native towns; however this means something different. Pompous summits or banquets of diplomats do not explain a puzzling dissimilarity, which exists. International politics is specific due to something else; it is a special functioning of power in the world political system.

The understanding of international politics in this study is not out of line of its traditional concept. First of all, this statement means that it is not a policy of nations, but mainly the policy of countries in the world policy system. However, today, this does not only relate to the policy among countries, though this part of international politics with the help of which sovereign governments try to ensure their security and to fulfil many and sometimes conflicting objectives, is the most important. If the collocation “policy among countries” is too narrow on one hand, – the term “international affairs” is too wide for this study on the other hand – as the book is focused on those parts of international affairs that are of natural political character, whereby economic, social, cultural, and ecological relations are put aside. According to this meaning, it neither means “inter-national” politics, nor international affairs, but world politics. However, the term “world politics” is often understood in the Czech surrounding as the policy in the world, e.g. the interior policy of another country, the policy related to the world as a whole, etc. Therefore we use a traditional, though semantically inaccurate, but in general understandable term – international politics.

Prague, July 2006

E. Conflict

18/ PROPAGANDA, ESPIONAGE, TERRORISM

The idea of the world political system functioning in accordance with the principles of the balance of power presupposes that power is the final degree of the political value of argument, claim, or interest. Nicholas Spykman says finally, *the security of nation depends on force* and political strategy; therefore the state must *deal with the same power factors*¹ either during a period of war or during a period of peace.

However, the power tools of international politics are not only used during wars, but also during periods of peace. There are many power tools that can be used with regard to the various types of conflicts. This is also applicable under the conditions when diplomacy and law, as tools of cooperative policy, are separated from war, as tools of uncooperative policy. Indisputably, this differentiation is functional: though the cooperative policy, that is possible thanks to the closeness of interests, is full of contradictions and conflicts, it respects the sovereignty of states; the uncooperative policy is that policy which violates the principles of other state's sovereignty with the purpose of achieving unilateral advantages. Such a division in cooperative and uncooperative political actions represent the determination of limited values on the scale of state activities. There are significant intergrades between these two poles. On one hand, "the cooperative" power activities, without the violation of sovereignty, are represented by the above mentioned formation of alliances or economic pressure. On the other hand, among uncooperative activities, we can find such activities as propaganda that does not use physical violence, but it violates sovereignty in its ideal form. Espionage and international terrorism use force, but they are not war in its classical form.

Propaganda

¹ SPYKMAN, Nicholas J: *The Geography of the Peace*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1944, p. 5.

Propaganda neither can be understood as the exchange of information, nor enlightenment – though it can fulfil both of these functions. If propaganda is taken into account, and contrary to simple information, there is an emphasis on it being a systematic activity focused on the change of values and actions in such a manner that it addresses emotions and prejudices more than reason – and therefore it can use misleading information. The purpose of propaganda is not to increase knowledge, but to influence and to manipulate values to change an attitude and specifically, the political activities of people. Words, symbols, gestures, slogans, etc. are used for this purpose. If propaganda is understood as efforts to persuade other people, then it is a component of human nature. Its methodology was worked out in Europe in the science named rhetoric by Sicilian Greeks, Korax, Tesias, and specifically by sophists during the 5th century B.C.; the term of orator fuses with the term of statesman or educated man. The word “propaganda” itself is derived from the institution named Congregatio de propaganda fide – the Congregation for the Propagation of Faith – that was established by the pope Gregory XV in the year 1622, and that assumed the administration of Catholic Church missionary activities.

Propaganda in international politics is the activity that is focused on the public of the other state and through it, to the bearer of sovereignty, the state's power elite. Thus this represents the violation of principle “whose government is, religion accordingly” i.e. the sovereignty of state – though the violation of sovereignty is without physical violence. Such an activity is of course as old as actions of conflict among state formations; e.g. the Bible says that the Assyrian king Sancherib used a threatening propaganda against Judah (2Kr 18-19). At the same time, interstate propaganda was not very frequent, because political units were relatively isolated: transport was complicated, there were no other forms of communication, the literacy of inhabitants was very low. The establishment of permanent diplomatic missions and fixed rules of immunity for diplomats, that apart from others should ensure information, represented the turning point. Printed words became a propagation media in the conflict between Martin Luther and the Catholic church; during the Thirty Years' War, all fighting parties were using printed propaganda. However, propaganda acquired a new form with regard to two facts:

- the democratization and the nationalization of policy – when the literacy of masses increased, power elites became partially dependent on the public;
- the development of mass media.

Historians of propaganda do not hesitate to research into ancient times, whereby the comments on the use of propaganda by Alexander the Great have become classic. However, the beginning of mass political propaganda relates to the history of the World War I. Then, not only the British and the Germans were in conflict, but they were also developing mass pressure upon the American public in their efforts to acquire the sympathy of the U.S.A. for their military goals. It was just in those days, when propaganda became the synonym of lie, because both fighting parties “were producing” stories about the brutality and inhumanity of the opponent. The term “psychological war” comes from the beginning of the 20s and it was used for the first time in the analyses of World War I; the term “psychological operations” appeared in the American plans in the year 1945 for the first time.

After the fascists took power, state propaganda became an issue organized purposively – and the interstate propagandistic fight became systematized. Technical development resulted in that during the World War II the spoken word replaced the written word again, but in a different form – radio played the most important role in all fighting parties. Goebbels's ministry of propaganda has become a deterrent example of propaganda manipulation. Fascist propaganda also worked out the effective principles that influence man consciousness and that have been used so far: (a) avoiding abstract ideas and turning to emotions; (b) it is necessary to repeat a small number of ideas, to use pattern phrases; (c) to use only supporting argu-

ments, not to state reasons against; (d) to criticize the enemies of nations constantly; (e) to identify a concrete enemy and to work out the special strategy of fight against the enemy.¹

During the propaganda war after 1945, socialist countries had a relative advantage, because the central monopoly of information allowed a better coordination of propaganda, much better use of strategy and tactics; at the same time, the censorship of disturbing radio propaganda from the West “sheltered” inhabitants from undesirable influences. This relative advantage disintegrated during the eighties, when the development of communication technology – from computers with printers, copiers, faxes, mobile telephones, up to satellite TV networks – devaluated the classical concept of information blockade.

In the year 1986, after bombing the capital of Libya, chosen journalists were invited to a press conference with the American minister of foreign affairs and the minister of defence, to the U.S.A. Embassies abroad through satellite network. The same year, the inhabitants of the Soviet Union were informed through the west radio broadcasting for the USSR about the breakdown of the nuclear reactor in Chernobyl, which was detected by American satellites – this information from the West was provided earlier than the official news from Moscow. Based on these examples, it is obvious that the content of propaganda is only one aspect of its effectiveness – the second condition of effectiveness is represented by speed and technical background. For example, the dissemination of tapes with the sermons of Ayatollah Khomeini against the emigration of the Shah in Iran. Another example, as in the year 1975, is when the Chilean military junta hired the advertising agency in New York and paid them to improve the image of the government. State propaganda of this type can also be indirect, using institutions that are not focused on propaganda. For example, financial assistance to youth organizations, trade unions or any other organizations, or even political parties, which was done by socialist countries within the framework of communist movement assistance, but also by the CIA in Italy.

Theorists have already differentiated so called black, grey, and white propaganda, according to the degree of informational truth:

- „White propaganda” is information focused on the cooperative actions of a state. “White” propagandists identify themselves with information and they state true sources of information;
- „Grey propaganda” takes into account the worsen relations with the state whose government is the goal of this propaganda. The sources of information area referred, but the choice of this information is specified to differentiate “good” and “bad” target groups or individuals, or “good people” and “bad government”;
- „Black propaganda” is identical with the psychological war. The references to information sources is the part of manipulation disinformation, the objective is to demoralize the government and to evoke the desired change in the political behaviour of elites and the public. It is a component of military efforts, when the truth of information becomes the first victim of war due to censorship.

In general, it can be said that during the second half of the twentieth century, interstate propaganda was improved to a large extent due to the ferocity of bipolar confrontation and telecommunication development.

- First of all, the systematization of ideological confrontation, that was linked with the centralization of efforts and large amount of means for this form of struggle in the hands of great powers, has increased. The campaigns have become more purposive, more complex, there has been apparent efforts to determine realistic goals. The propagandistic pressure

¹ See JOWETT, G. S.: *Propaganda and Persuasion*. Newbury Park etc, 1992, p. 186. According to POČEPCOV, Georgij G.: *Psichologičeskie vojny*. Moskva: Refl-buk a Vakler, 2000, p. 233.

has accommodated to the newest information from psychology, social psychology, and sociology.

- This is also related to the increase in concept complexity of these efforts, more concrete aiming of ideological actions to specific features of countries and groups to which the propaganda is addressed – but also more precise understanding of the political goals of ideological pressure. Furthermore, propaganda tries not only to affect groups as a whole, but is also tries to control intergroup communication: they look for the influential persons, the information favourites that are the effective element of further information dissemination, it influences attitudes and behaviour. It is obvious that from this point of view, a journalist is more important than a dentist, the dentist is more important than a cleaner.
- The sharpening of ideological action also relates to the increased immediate ideological confrontation that on one hand resulted from the increase in the possibilities of mass media and on the other hand from the development of tourism, the exchange of cultural, scientific, sport and economic delegations, etc.
- At the same time the sharpening of propagandistic struggle is related to the increased elaborateness that resulted not only from the increased system complexity and immediateness, but also from the choice of new topics that became the focus of ideological struggle or tools of ideological manipulation. In particular, in the end of the Cold War, “the academic-political complex” (Hans Morgenthau) was more closely linked, whereby policy became less intellectualized in the countries of the Soviet bloc, which were disarming its propaganda.

Propaganda acquired the characteristic of a struggle that had its own strategy, tactics, and logistics. All this was realized under the conditions of mass media rapid development. Today, almost every government manages some information-propagation program abroad – though it only is to support tourism or attract investors. However, only the great powers are able to create the sufficient background for the systematic political propagandistic campaign, either by influencing journalists from other countries or by its own activities abroad.

Propaganda during a period of military conflicts represent a specific sphere of interests. Today, theorists differentiate five moments of war propaganda: (a) secret planning, (b) demonization of hostile party leader, (c) destabilization of target regime, (d) looking for the legitimacy of own activities, and (e) choice of preferred journalists. It is apparent from the above mentioned that psychological war as a supportive military operation is not only directed against enemies, but it is also focused on the inhabitants of own states. It is necessary to ensure the support of military activities, in today's information society, by the government. Saudi Arabia can be used as an interpolitical example.

During the Persian Gulf War at the beginning of the 90s, they hired the company Hill & Knowlton for the price of 12 million dollars to create the required public opinion for the fight against Iraq. From this point of view, the so-called effect of CNN represents a new experience: the TV staff provided viewers with information from battlefields at such a level that the U.S.A.'s president also watched it. This “live” war even resulted in the fact that CNN informed continuously about the situation in bombed Baghdad. Yugoslavian government learnt a lesson from this and they expelled journalists from NATO countries during the bombing in 1999. Then, they themselves informed TV news staff about the bombing with information that was at least partially taken by the west's TV companies to illustrate their own standpoints. The “live” war became a struggle for information monopoly, for the embargo of opponent opinions: in order that NATO could prevent the transmission of undesirable visual information and opinions, they bombed the centre of Yugoslavian TV in Belgrade.

The strength of the modern mass media is such that some authors have started to differentiate between the objective reality and the virtual reality. Globalization is related to the formation of worldwide information networks and not only to classical ones in the form of su-

pranational newspaper, radio, and TV corporations, but also to internet networks at present. This is the fastest developing media of global information integration. The existence of the internet as a decentralized source of news allows the breaking of the information embargo; also, the ability of governments to manipulate this network has increased as well. Furthermore, the internet has become a specific battlefield: in 1999, pro-Yugoslavia hackers attacked the web pages of NATO, and Palestinian hackers the web pages of the Israel government in 2000.

Today's cultural and informational domination of the West is one of the most significant integration elements of the world political system and the hegemonic arrangement of its structure. The globalizing world shows a similar information asymmetry as the world political system with a hegemonic leader at the top of the power pyramid. The problem of information sovereignty has started to be mentioned – with regard to this, Howard Frederick says *data sovereignty is usually measured to the extent in which a nation controls the collecting, storing, analysis, manipulation and delivering of data.*¹ Mass media has become a new tool of social control and society is on a crossroad where information often replaces the army. With regard to this, not only the necessity of economic liberation, but also informational liberation, is mentioned in developing countries: the requirement to establish a new international informational order was first expressed at the 4th Conference of Non-aligned Countries in Algeria in 1973. This idea was also followed at the 20th meeting of UNESCO general conference, and at the 34th meeting of the UN General Assembly. In this case, medial imperialism is often mentioned.²

The current network of informational exchange works in the following manner: African countries get information about other African countries through London and Paris; the countries of Latin America through New York. Globalization introduces many specific features of American culture into the flow of information. As information is a vassal of profit, and if there is no interest of the state, then mass media puts stress on emotiveness, theatricality, entertainment, and not on the import and the truth- more on the exceptionality that on representativeness, more on glitz that to relevance. At the same time, “the fulfilment of information obligation” in the context of liberal political culture results in automatic verbal moralism that necessarily need not be provoked by strategic propagandistic aims (e.g. journalist abbreviation) – and at the same time, it need not be acceptable for everybody: Vietnam “was conquered”, Afghanistan was “liberated”, the contras are “fighters for freedom”, the Palestinians “terrorists”, Iraq was “punished”, etc.

The question of impact upon information sources has become a problem not only in developing countries, but also in such large countries such as Russia. In September 2000, president Vladimir Putin signed the Doctrine of the Information Security of the Russian Federation. However, these topics also have general validity: two months prior to the origination of the above mentioned doctrine, the G8 group adopted the Okinawa Charter on Global Information Society which emphasizes the significance of the private sector for the establishment of information and communication networks, and at the same time it states that “it is a task of the governments to create the foreseeable and non-discriminating policy and the normative base that are necessary for information society”.

Despite enormous efforts, invested money, and achievements during history, purposive political propaganda cannot be considered to be a tool that can always generally change opinions, attitudes, and public behaviour – specifically, to evoke desirable mass political activities, to change the foreign-political orientation of state, or to overthrow the government. The model of its most effective use, shown on the using of the slogan of human rights, also proves that

¹ FREDERICK, Howard H.: *Global Communication and International Relationp.* Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1993, p. 121.

² Ibid., p. 135.

propaganda cannot be relied on as the tool that solves everything. The biggest success is achieved by foreign policy propaganda if it sensitively reacts to the existing internal problems of the target state – it responds to the revolution situation. Propaganda is an accompanying tool of the other power activities of state, or specifically one of the state power tools that can be used carefully, but also improperly.

Espionage

The activities of secret services are the other state activities that violate the principles of sovereignty and that can be included among uncooperative activities. As far as the relations of states is concerned, espionage means the violation of regulations or any other norms, it is an illegal activity with regard to the interstate legislation of the country, where it is realized. The work of intelligence is focused on three spheres:

- **COLLECTION AND EVALUATION OF INFORMATION.** The focus is on the most important information, very often on those that are kept back by the other party. The term “secret” presupposes that information should not be made public due to some reason by the owner of this information, generally due to security reasons. Information is collected as an inevitable condition for decision making, either in political, military, or economic spheres;
- **SECRET OPERATIONS**, whose purpose is to influence the interior or foreign policies of state. These activities can be arranged on a scale, starting from the dissemination of disinformation up to the organization of subversive activities of paramilitary groups;
- **COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE**, i.e. activities against the same institutions of foreign states.

The efforts to conceal own strategic information and to acquire, as much as possible, foreign information that is necessary for the management and planning of foreign policy, specifically diplomacy and the army, is part of a state’s security that is ensured under the conditions of the anarchically arranged world political system and that relies on self-help. The collecting of information is a vitally important tool of diplomacy and war. Though all states have acts against espionage, most states, and mainly the great powers, have also institutions for their own intelligence. Espionage is a hidden dimension of international policy and a missing part of history in general.

As early as two thousand and five hundred years ago, Mister Sun precisely instructed how to organize espionage, including how to work with dual spies and deserters in his treatise *The Art of War*. Kautilya described secret operations, including poisoning hostile rulers, the forcing of priests to misinform during preaches etc., in his essay, *Arthashastra*. Modern espionage is often attributed to the name of Francis Walsingham, the secretary of the English queen Elisabeth I during the second half of the 16th century, whose agents infiltrated important European courts of those days. It is said that Walsingham was managing a network of 53 top agents, he knew about the secret plan of the Spanish king Philip II to attack England before the king informed his own ministers about this plan, he sent a doctor to the Russian tsar Fyodor Ivanovich (the sending of doctors to foreign courts was a popular intelligence technique of the Venetians in the 15th century) who apart from compiling horoscopes succeeded in establishing a currier connection with London in order to send cryptographic information, etc. In any case, it was Walsingham who found the base of the famous British secret service. However, it was only in the 18th and 19th centuries when Joseph Fouché, the minister of the revolutionary Napoleon government who established the first modern Ministry of Policy, established the first really professional network of agents focused on political and military intelligence and the defence against it. Prince Klemens Metternich followed Fouché’s experience, as well as the Guards of Tsar. Prussian espionage, on one hand, played an important role in the reunion of Germany, and on the other hand, in the Prussian-French War. At the end of 19th

century, the professional secret services of great powers were very common. Systematic espionage helped Japan in the war with Russia during the years 1904 – 1905.

The World Wars were commanded with the immersed help of all included parties intelligence agencies; specifically, World War II had a significant impact upon the development of intelligence. Any big military operation of World War II is connected with a disinformation campaign of the secret services – in general, all major attacks could be foreseen politically, but they were militarily surprising: the attack on the Soviet Union was surprising for the soviet leaders, the attack on Pearl Harbor is a good example of successful Japanese intelligence, and the Allied Landings in Normandy proves the success of Anglo-Saxon intelligence. These facts prove that the intelligence support of the offensive prevails the intelligence support of the defence.

After World War II, with regard to the risks of mankind's self-destruction comprised in international policy, the significance of intelligence has increased. For example, it is estimated that the U.S.A. employs 200 thousand employees for secret services and that the Soviet Union's secret service and its counter espionage had 400 thousand employees and co-workers during the 80s (including frontier guards). The American intelligence, CIA, originated after several reorganizations after the end of World War II in the year 1947. Its centres have been located in Langley, near Washington, since 1959. After the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, the U.S.A.'s attention to intelligence as the most important tool of fight against terrorism, has increased significantly. In the United States itself, it has been the largest reorganization of intelligence since the year 1947. In the year 2004, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) was established. It is in charge of the coordination of 16 civilian, military, and technical institutions dealing with intelligence. According to some information, this community has the budget of USD 40 milliard (recent information on CIA web pages shows that the U.S.A. spent the amount of USD 26.7 milliard for its overall intelligence in the year 1998). However, only the smaller part of these funds is allocated to the CIA – approximately 80 % of total expenses falls upon the intelligence managed by the Ministry of Defence. In October 2005, DNI made public the document named The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America. Transformation through Integration and Innovation.¹

The collecting of information represents the core of espionage. It requires knowing what kind of information should be gathered, to administer institutes. Without doubt, the secret service's most important task is to warn against hostile military plans. At the same time, this is the most significant activity. Probably, the evaluation of acquired information is the most difficult task of secret services, whereby this function is not only covered by working with the material acquired from agents' secret illegal operations – the collection, systematization and the evaluation of various freely available information from mass media, professional journals, diplomats discussions, satellite and electronic intelligence in general, etc., is not of less importance. However, the analysis does not end the problem of perfect intelligence – the question is how the acquired information is used in political practice itself. Roger Hilsman refers to research from the end of the 50s and beginning of the 60s related to the work of 65 American governmental head officials who were the producers or the receivers of information from secret services.² Based on the analysis of their answers, he concludes that the following is typical for such agents:

- The simplifying and the certain mistrust of a complex solution. Though they respect the need to understand nature by means of science and technique, they consider common

¹ CIA – http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/faq.html#3 and The Director of National Intelligence <http://www.dni.gov/index.htm>

² See HILSMAN, R., Jr.: *Intelligence and Policy-Making in Foreign Affairs*: In: *International Politics and Foreign Policy. A Reader in Research and Theory*. Edited by J. N. Rosenau. New York, Free Press of Glencoe 1961, p. 213–217.

sense to be better for understanding social problems. Besides, it allows the fast and simple understanding of the problem;

- Organizational thinking. Reorganization is understood as a tool of improving foreign policy;
- The attitude to facts. “If someone collects facts in the same manner as he thinks about policy, he will tend to select the facts supporting his policy than to look for a true answer by collecting all facts”. The facts represent the self-justifying of answers; they offer the only right answer;
- The attitude to experience. The anti-intellectualism is apparent there – the key experience that results from the immediate participation in events. Knowledge itself is the natural, automatic by-product of practical experience for many years.

Such conclusions result in the question, whether it is suitable to let secret services analyse information. At the same time, there is an apparent similarity of mistakes of decisions made by secret service agents and politicians. Therefore, it is not possible to assume that the evaluation of information by politicians will result in a more visible success. Furthermore, Roger Hilsman points out that more people with academic education work for secret services in comparison with public policy.

The secret services of great powers fulfil similar tasks and use similar methods accordingly. Espionage organizations working illegally abroad, due to their internal political culture, can also work on the edge of legality in their counter-espionage activities in their own territories. Secret organizations are the bearers of political hostility, because they regularly connect conflict behaviour not only with their true professionalism, similarly to soldiers, but also with ideological prejudices. On the other hand, there is a complex of gentleman principles for the work of intelligence, specifically when they meet – something like a club codex of those who deal with the “business of nobles” (Wilhelm Canaris), but also with regard to the political and diplomatic cover of those activities.

Terrorism

According to the most general definitions, terrorism is a systematic use of violence, predominantly against civilians. We speak about the terror of government against citizens, the terror of criminal groups, the terror of political groups, and the terror of state and non-political actors in the international scene. Terrorism acquires a political form the moment when its actors have political objectives – either it relates to the pressure on a government or a political institution of the type of political party. The element of the systematic use of violence is considered by some authors to be a defining aspect of the term of terrorism – e.g. the assassinations of the tsar Alexander II and other prominent persons of Russia at the end of the 19th century that were part of the revolutionary program, are considered to be terrorist acts, contrary to the assassinations of Abraham Lincoln, John F. Kennedy, or Jicchak Rabin that were motivated politically, but who were not part of the program and therefore, according to some definitions – controversially, they cannot be considered to be terrorist acts.

It is quite difficult to find the specification of terrorism from the legal point of view, because terrorism comprises political, military, and criminal aspects of this activity – terrorists refuse to respect military norms; the dealing of terrorists as criminals means making martyrs from them, and to perceive them only as politicians, is unrealistic. It is very vague to perceive terrorism as some kind of guerrilla war – terrorism in all forms accompanies all wars. It is neither a political movement, nor an ideology; terrorism is a strategy and a method of fighting various ideological and religious groups.

Terrorism is a phenomenon as old as mankind. In the beginning, political terrorism was justified by religion of various kinds: terrorism has been justified by Judaism, Islamism, Hinduism, and Christianity. In the New Age, “terrorism” was first used with regard to the Great

French Revolution – terrorism was understood as the rule with violence and intimidation through violence. It was difficult to differentiate, under conditions of total war, between the regime saving the combating armies in battlefields and “extraordinary peoples courts” behind the battlefields – both were concerned with the overall public. In this case, it was a state terrorism. Since the 1890s, with regard to the Russian movement “Narodnaja Volja” (National Will), the term of “terrorist” has been used for political rebels, who would like to change a regime in the form of main political representative’s assassinations. Both these versions, “French” and “Russian”, are typical of the fact that they linked terror with the moral catharsis of society and the establishment of fair arrangement – and it was considered to be an automatic response to the malice of the powerful. After the origination of totalitarian countries in the 1930s, the term “terrorism” mainly started to be used for the internal policies of these countries ; since the 50s, the term “terrorism” has again been used to name anti-governmental rebels. Thus, gradually four kinds of terrorism have been profiled with regard to program objectives among anti-governmental groups and movements – revolutionary, separatist, rightist, and religious terrorisms. According to the study of David Rapoport Terrorism, four terrorist waves were noticed from the end of the 19th century:

- The first wave of terrorism followed the above mentioned activities of Russian nationalists at the end of the 19th century, and it reached its climax with the assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand. The anarchists of those days were following revolutionary objectives in Europe; the terrorist separatist movements fighting for national independence appeared in the Ottoman Empire. Those day’s forms of rightist terror can be represented by racist pogroms in tsarist Russia, or the activities of the Ku-Klux-Klan in the United States – they even preceded the activities of terrorists.
- The second wave of terrorism occurred after World War I and it reached its climax during the period after World War II. The separatist movements were the most important and this wave fell off together with the disintegration of colonial empires and the establishment of new states (Israel, Cyprus, Yemen, Algeria, etc.); in some places, separatist movements were linked with revolutionary ideology or with religion in some other places. The rightist terrorist groups of those days included, for example, the Secret Army Organization (OAS) of French colonizers in Algeria.
- The third wave appeared at the end of the 60s and it was closely linked with the Indochina War. The effectiveness of the combat methods of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, that also used terror, decreased the credibility of western countries and renewed the ideas about the possibilities of determined groups to overcome modern technique and the power of government. Revolutionary ethos appear again, though they had not been seen during the second wave; this time, in the form of Marxist-anarchistic groups, e.g. Weather Underground (the United States), the Red Army Fraction (Germany), the Red Brigades (Italy), the Red Army (Japan), Tupamaros (Uruguay), Montoneros (Argentina), and the Direct Action (France). At that time, separatist groups very often professed some revolutionary slogans – e.g. the organization for Basque Nation and Liberation (ETA) or the Irish Republican Army (IRA). After the end of the Vietnam War, the role of the revolutionary example, for many followers, was taken by the organization for Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), a peculiar association of revolutionary and separatist groups, whereby the Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine was mostly blamed for the use of terror. During the third wave, the term “international terrorism” appears which first responded to the fact that some terrorist groups realized most of the attacks abroad – e.g. the PLO and allied groups were more active than European terrorists. Various national groups, who were cooperating and attacking in third countries – e.g. the kidnapping of the ministries from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, OPEC; it is said that in Vienna in 1975, the members of OOP, Baader-Meinhof’s group

and IRA, trained in the PLO bases in the Middle East – cooperated. The international character of this wave is symbolized by highjackings that appear for the first time during this wave. At the same time, the direct support of terrorist groups by some states is mentioned, specifically, Libya, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, etc. These changes resulted in such situations when for example, according to official American data, ETA was supported by Libya, Lebanon, Nicaragua – and ETA cooperated with IRA. The third wave fell off with regard to the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

- At present, the activities of rightist and religious terrorists take leading positions; though they were formed during the period of the third wave. Apart from others, the rightist groups differ from the other terrorist groups, “they avoid publicity and sometimes, they are directly supported by government, police, and army”. In Latin America, they very often have the form of the anonymous “squadron of death” that liquidate undesirable persons: e.g. the Commando of Fight against Communists (Brazil) and the Secret Anti-communist Army (Guatemala), but also the Grey Wolves in Turkey and the Apostle Anti-communist Alliance. Northern Ireland has its protestant Union to protect Ulster. Muslim fundamentalism became a specific phenomenon of the fourth wave. The Iranian Revolution in 1979 is considered to be its new starting point. The success of this revolution was followed by Shia terrorism, which made itself famous by suicide attacks in Lebanon as well as the Sunni terrorism, which is responsible for the attack on the Big Mosque in Mecca (1979) and the assassination of the Egyptian President Anwar Al Sadat (1981). Its impact can also be seen upon Syria, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Philippines, Indonesia, etc. At present, the Hezbollah movement is most often blamed for the use of terrorist techniques in the Middle East. The activities of Sikh terrorists, who aim to establish the independent religious state, Punjab, can also be included into the fourth wave. The religious difference between the Hindu and the Buddhists is the main cause of unceasing and very bloody conflict in Sri Lanka. The Jewish religious terrorists made an attempt to blast the sacral Islamic sight, the rocky temple in Jerusalem, and they still lead a combat campaign against the Palestinian dignitaries; the life of the Israeli Prime Minister is on their conscience. Christianity has its examples of terrorism mainly in Northern Ireland and the United States.¹

The term “terrorism” itself acquired an emotional undertone and it is identified with such techniques as murders, bomb attacks, kidnapping, etc. The last terrorists, who identified themselves in accordance with the above mentioned, were members of the revolt organization Lehi (the audacious), who used terrorist methods to establish the state of Israel during the 40s. However, since that time, terrorists have marked their enemies as terrorists as well, and they have no problem in finding examples of state violence that do not differ from terrorist fights. Furthermore, the “non-standard” forms of the work of secret services and terrorist groups overlap, not to mention the “Balzac” connection between political elites and criminal underground: e.g. the investigation in the year 1996 points out that the assassination of the Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro in 1978, committed by the Red Brigades, was also partaking by mafia and other Italian Prime Ministers.

Generally speaking, terrorism is a political tool of the armed fight of the weak against the strong ones. In principle, it is a strategy that presupposes great victory and small risk. The efforts to decrease the risks to a minimum with this strategy result in the increase in the anonymity of terrorists and targets – therefore the most frequent tool of terrorist attacks is a bomb charge and very often the target is chosen as “an object of substitute”. In general, there are several main targets of terrorists:

¹ According to RAPOPORT, D. C.: *Terrorism*. In: *Encyclopedia of Government and Politics*. Vol. 2. Edited by M. Hawkesworth and M. Kogan. Vol. 1 and 2. London and New York, Routledge, 1992, p. 1064–1067. Modifaed.

- Advertising target. Terrorists inform about their existence, resolution, and the program of terrorist organization. It is relatively easy to achieve this target with mass media focused on dramatic, drastic, and exclusive news; however, at the same time governments with their activities, and also liberal democratic governments, restrict the advertising use of terrorism wisely. The advertising target can only be realized in democratic countries, however mass media controlled just by liberals describe terrorists in a bad light and thus they help to shorten the life of their groups;
- Single act of violence. The destroying of selected object or objects, the liquidation of a specific man or people, etc. can become a target of the terrorists. The purpose of such activities is to scare a political power or to press the political power to enforce negotiations. In this case, with the tactical use of violence, the cowardly use of target objects of substitution, an attack on innocent people that have nothing or little to do with the preparation or the realization of governmental policy, is the least ethical side of terrorism. However, a single act of violence can also serve for the purpose of their own strengthening; e.g. acquiring more arms and finance, a release of prisoners, etc.;
- Strategic target. Terrorism can also be understood as a decisive or the only tool of regime destabilization. Anarchistic doctrinal concepts (e.g. of Michail A. Bakunin, Petr A. Kropotkin, Sergio Nachayev, and many others), assume that terrorists activities will provoke state power to such violence that will result in the unmasking of their reactionary nature and in a revolutionary revolt of the masses.

International terrorism represents a specific problem not only with regard to legal and theoretical definitions, but also with regard to the determination of the policy against it. In the United States, the most known survey of world terrorism and political principles of fight against it, is annually submitted by the Department of State. This material was originally published under the name *Types of International Terrorism*. In accordance with this document, the official policy of the United States against terrorism was based on four main principles: a) no compromising with terrorists and no negotiating with terrorists, b) to bring terrorists to court, c) to isolate and to press the states that support terrorism with the aim to force them to change their behaviour, and d) to increase counter-terrorist capacities of the countries that cooperate with the United States and need help. Since 1983, the governmental authorities of the United States have used three indicators for statistical and analytical objectives to specify international terrorism:


- Terrorism is the intended, politically motivated, actions committed against non-combatant targets by non-state groups or secret agents, as a rule focused on influencing the public. In this case, the term “non-combatant” also includes soldiers who are not armed at the time of incidents or who are not in service;
- International terrorism is terrorism in which citizens and territories from more than one state, are involved;
- The terrorist group is the group that practises international terrorism, or which has significant sub-groups that do so.¹

Though we can have reservations regarding this operational definition, the above mentioned reports provide us with very interesting statistical data. According to the date, the turning point of the use of terrorism occurred during the years 1971 and 1972, when the number of international terrorist attacks exceeded 500; after the year 1983, there was a new moderate increase in terrorist attacks; the largest number of attacks was recorded in 1987 and so far since then, the number of terrorist attacks have oscillated. The number of terrorist attacks decreased after terrorist attacks against the U.S.A. in September 2001. Graph No. 3 shows the oscillation of the number of international terrorist incidents from the mid- 70s until 2003.²

¹ *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000*. Washington: U.P. Department of State – <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2000/>

² *Patterns of Global Terrorism 1994*. Washington: U.P. Department of State, 1995, *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000* and

Graph No. 3: ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, 1975 – 2003



Significant changes occurred after September 11, 2001. With regard to this terrorist attack and according to available data, apart from 19 hijackers, 2976 people died and 24 are still registered as missing. The consequential antiterrorists measures organized all over the world prevented many attacks, but did not prevent all of them – according to some critics of G. Bush's policy, invasions to Afghanistan and Iraq, justified as a necessary part of the fight against global terrorism, even multiplied the activities of terrorists. The most tragic examples after September 2001 are: the terrorist attacks on tourist centre in the Indonesian island Bali in October 2002 where 202 people were killed and 2009 injured; the attacks on the train in Spanish Madrid in March 2004 where 191 killed and more than 1700 injured; the attack at the beginning of September 2004 in Russian Beslan due to the occupation of a school by terrorists where 329 died, thereof 159 children, and more than one thousand people were injured; the attack in July 2006 in Indian *Bombay* where the coordinated bomb attack on suburban area railway resulted in the death of 207 and more than 700 injured people; and there were many others.

After September 2001, The United States changed the methodology of working out the Department of State's report on international terrorism and terrorism abroad. Since 2005, it is named Country Reports on Terrorism and it is not only focused on international terrorism, but to a large extent, on terrorism in general. Its statistical data is based on the work of the National Counterterrorism Centre (NCTC) that was established in 2004. Data which they make public is significantly affected by interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, where the presence of foreign armies and accompanying civil personnel is connected with the activities of local resistance movements, whereby the situation in Iraq in mid- 2006 resembled civil war in many aspects. Table No. 7 shows basic data according to this report from 2005. According to this material, in 2005 approximately 360 suicide attacks were committed and their outcome was 20 % of all people killed in the world. From approximately 40 thousand killed or injured in the world due to terrorism, 10 – 15 thousand of them were Muslims, which represent the largest group specified according to some characteristic. There were killed or injured due to terrorism, approximately 6.6 thousand of policeman, thousands of children, 300 governmental

officials, 170 church officials, 140 teachers, and 110 journalists. The US Department of State announced that in 2005, terrorists killed 56 Americans, thereof 47 in Iraq.¹

Table No. 7: TERRORIST ATTACKS IN THE WORLD, 2005

terrorist incidents	11 111
terrorist incidents resulting in death, injury or kidnapping of at least one person	8016
terrorist incidents resulting in death of at least one person	5131
terrorist incidents resulting in death of at least 10 persons	226
terrorist incidents resulting in injury of at least one person	3 827
terrorist incidents kidnapping at least one person	1145
persons in the world – killed, injured, or kidnapped due to terrorists acts	74 087
persons in the world killed due to terrorists acts	14 602
persons in the world injured due to terrorists acts	24 705
persons kidnapped in the world due to terrorists acts	34 780

Thereof, terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan	
terrorist incidents in Iraq	3474
terrorist incidents in Iraq resulting in death, injury, or kidnapping of at least one person	2839
persons in Iraq, killed, injured, or kidnapped due to terrorists acts	20 711
terrorist incidents in Afghanistan	489
terrorist incidents in Afghanistan resulting in death, injury, or kidnapping at least of one person	1 365
persons in Afghanistan, killed, injured, or kidnapped due to terrorists acts	1533

Discussions about the methodology of these report analysis bring up questions as to whether the data about the detailed numbers of terrorism groups do not include, for example, the Kosovo Liberation Army, or the subversive activities of Israel. The change of terrorist organizations also contribute to the worries of analysts. There is a difference between the small terrorist groups of the 70s and those that attract whole attention at present – specifically, the Palestinian Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) and the Lebanon Hezbollah (Party of God). According to the quoted report of the US Department of State, the Sunni Hamas is a terrorist organization and it has an unknown number of members and thousands of sympathizers and supporters. The strength of the Lebanon Shia Hezbollah is characterized similarly: thousands of members and supporters, hundreds of active terrorists. However, some Arabic mass media and some Arabic politicians in their speeches perceive these organizations as part of Palestinian or Lebanon civil societies.

Both are true. Hamas as well as Hezbollah have large civil, social-political activities; for example, Hezbollah not only operates hospitals, orphanages, schools, but also TV and radio stations, and they publish weekly. Both organizations have their representatives in parliament and Hamas leads the government in Palestine, Hezbollah has two ministers in Lebanon. However, both organizations have military wings. They combat with arms with Israel, (or with their domestic political opponents), and this combat also includes attacks on civilians – which also corresponds with the simplest definitions of terrorism.

According to the US Department of State, seven countries could be characterized as sponsors of international terrorism; including Iran, Cuba, North Korea, and Syria, this means that Iraq, Sudan, and Libya were excluded from the list. Though Sudan and Libya are still included in the characteristics of undesirable activities, but they are not included in the states and they succeeded to coordinate fights against terrorism.²

¹ *Country Reports on Terrorism 2005. Statistical Annex. Washington: U. P. Department of State, 2006, p. VI.*

² *Ibid.*, p. 182-262 and 171–177.

After the American Secretary of State Alexander Haig in 1980 called international terrorism the main danger, the theory also started to pay extraordinary attention to this phenomenon. Research points out that terrorist groups are not big as a rule – they rarely have more than 50 members, whereby every member is linked with four up to six persons that provide for material-technical support.

Almost 90 % of current terrorist groups have existed for less than one year – and most of those lasting more than one year will break up within ten years. Although revolutionary groups commenced a new history of terrorism, religious and ethnical groups last longer: religious terrorist groups always show a larger cohesiveness, will, orderliness, and also a better efficiency and longer duration than today's world terrorist groups. What is typical for all terrorist groups is the young age of their members – only a few of them are older than 30. There are mostly men, and women are more significantly represented only in revolutionary groups. The original revolutionary groups were recruited from university student, but later social specifications started to disappear.

The attack on the U.S.A. on September 2001 was very surprising for many analysts, because a general characteristics of terrorist, suicide, did not include pilots and people with university education. However, the political psychology has done a lot to describe the personality of terrorist. Despite the pressure from politicians and mass media, most political psychologist do not give in to simplified judgments that say that present terrorists are pathological personalities. Though the image of terrorist as mentally ill persons driven by destructive instincts surely correspond to some real persons, it cannot be understood as a general characteristics.

However, terrorism can be very attractive for some boundary driven and/or disorganized personalities. It is an activity producing stress, which can attract people looking for strong emotions. According to the results of research, it is possible to find extremely extrovert personalities with uncontrolled and impulsive behaviour, ruthless, egocentric, and uncaring people with narcissistic inclinations among terrorists. Such terrorists are blind to the negative consequences of their acts, they are resistant to stress, they have very little sense of danger, they refuse responsibility for their acts, and they hate boredom and passivity. Sometimes, neurotic, hostile, suspicious, aggressive, intolerant persons who refuse criticism and who are extremely sensitive to external hostility, are considered to be a prototype of terrorist leader. For such people, terrorism can be a projection of internal hostility.

According to the study of Ervin Staub and Daniel Bar-Tal, political psychologists from the United States and Israel, focused on genocide and mass killings during conflicts that could be only solved with difficulties, there exists an obvious similarity between the conditions that form the personality of terrorists (unless it is apparently a pathological personality), and the reasons for mass violence:

- First of all, a terrorist grows up in very difficult life conditions that can result in frustration due to non-satisfying basic psychic needs. One such need is represented by the requirement of safety for himself and family and the group to which the terrorist belongs.
- Sometimes the explanation of terrorism can be found in the identity of the personality. Future terrorists look for spiritual unity, solidarity, and a stable social role inside a group.
- The image of culprit is very important for the formation of the personality of a terrorist or a perpetrator of mass killing and genocide. This relates to the determination of the specific group which is responsible for – either in reality or probably – the bad living conditions. The opponent group is dishonoured with the help of negative categorization, and it is also dehumanized.
- Long lasting and intensive persecution by the powerful, results in trauma of a man, which evokes the impression that something must be wrong in his own fate or in the fate of the group which he is a member of, which requires action. Thus collective memory transfers

the feeling of victims and persecution through several generations, and also to people that need not necessarily be victims of violence.

The enormous problem is terrorism that accompanies justified liberation movements. If it is generally accepted that the evil of terrorism can be eliminated by the application of individual rules and we cannot use double standards, then the liberation movements have no other means at their disposal than violence. However, if society is governed by inhuman norms, then a deviation from them can be a manifestation of normality. Under such conditions, terrorism represents a defensive aggression – and furthermore, a learned response to social surroundings. In this case, and in general, it is a selective terrorism that does not attack anonymous civilians, but civil co-workers of hostile powers – agents, intelligence officers, representatives of state power, and collaborators from their own groups. Therefore, according to Staub and Bar-Tal, *the prevention of mass violence, severe conflicts, genocide, and mass killing is the essential task.*¹

International law has not dealt with the topic of international terrorism's complexly so far. In 1937, the United Nations adopted the Convention on the International Suppression of Terrorism, but it has never become effective. In 1972, the General Assembly of the United Nations established the commission to study these problems, and in December 1985, the UN General Assembly adopted, without voting, the Resolution on Measures to Prevent International Terrorism. The easiest way to compile international norms against terrorism seems to be treaties that only deal with chosen aspects of this activity, e.g. according to place and surroundings, types of victims, or hostages. The treaties on handing over hijackers (Hague Treaty from 1970, Montreal Treaty from 1971). At the same time, the adopted treaties sometimes have undesirable side-effects – e.g. the success of hijackers probably resulted in the increase in the number of bomb attacks on civil planes.

Following are activities of the United Nations regarding the preparation of international treaties against terrorism. In 1973, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents (effective since 1977), which follows with the context the above mentioned treaty of the United Nations. In 1979, the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, was signed (effective since 1983) which firstly used the term “international terrorism” – but its effects have been poor. The International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings was signed in 1997 (effective since 2001) and two years later the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (effective since 2002). The last success of the United Nations is represented by the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism that was signed in April 2005. Similar to the activities of the UN are apparent in many other international organizations as the European Union, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, APEC, and NATO.

The UN bodies have been working on a unified global counter-terrorist strategy since 2004. It is typical that the fight against terrorism is associated with the protection of human rights in the documents that accompany the preparation of this strategy – e.g. in the speech of the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan at the end of April 2006. Apart from others, his report points out that the 38 member states of the UN have not acceded to the convention that should prevent the financing of terrorism. The report includes efforts not only of eliminating such social-political sources of terrorism as poverty, religious, and ethnical discrimination, but also warnings against the danger of the penetration of militant ideologies to schools, and the need to fight against so called “cyberterrorism” including the warnings against the misuse of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists. It seems that the moment is getting closer when the legal opinion on terrorism will be unified and thus, also the strategy against it.

¹ STAUB, E., BAR-TAL, D.: *Genocide, Mass Killing, and Intractable Conflict*. In: *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*. Edited by D. O. Sears, L. Huddy, and R. L. Jervip. Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 710–726 (modified).

Libor Lukášek points out that the treaties on the fight against international terrorism “have not been a firm part of international criminal law so far... the culprits of criminal acts with international element are not liable according to international law, but their culpability and the imposing of punishment are only possible according to the norms of individual interstate legislations”. The pressure on applying the principle *aut dedere, aut judicare* – to hand over or to try, has increased. Furthermore, there not only exists a unified legal definition of international terrorism, but the international treaties using this term “do not notice the problem of state terrorism at all”¹ – which can be also noticed with regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

In general, it can be said that there are two main lines of legal definitions of terrorism that are also the source of a different concept on the legal protection against terrorism. According to “quantitative” definition, terrorism is the violence that does not correspond with any norms and traditions. Though this definition is self-explanatory at first sight, it is very vague. According to the second definition terrorism is any illegal rebellious effort. The concept of the second definition is followed by British and German antiterrorist acts from the 60s and 70s of the 20th century – but according to them, George Washington was also a terrorist.

* * *

Propaganda and espionage are non-cooperative tools of policy that if isolated from other activities, only rarely can result in a fundamental change of conflict solution. Terrorism represents a more painful problem. Terrorism, as a strategy of political fight seems to be ineffective. It is not economical as well – it evokes responses that bring more loss than profit. During the last period, only dramatic suicide attacks of Hezbollah in Lebanon (in 1983 against the military quarters of the US marines and in 1984 against the U.S. Embassy) reached their aim in the form of withdrawal of American troops. On the other hand, the former Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein did not succeed in using terrorism for his aims, though he threatened to use this technique during the Second Gulf War. Terrorism is an effective force only as a supportive tool of a larger scale of military fight, and the social mobilization of masses. Though, international terrorism kill less human lives than diseases, hunger, wars, industrial and automobile accidents, it arouses deep fear for the future: specifically with regard to the possible use of weapons of mass destruction for the acts of terrorism.

19/ ARMED CONFLICT AND WAR

Theorists of international politics are not attracted by war due to romantic reasons, but because of its existentialist dimension. Though the real history of man does not start with killing other human beings, but with the domestication of animals and agriculture, historians more often describe in chronicles destroyed towns and slaughtered nations than the work of farmer and craftsman. Despite the fact that theorist do not concur in whether man is peace-loving or fatally condemned to violent behaviour due to the first sin or due to his nature, they agree that war has accompanied mankind all over its history. Erich Fromm states in his remarkable book *Anatomy of Human Destructiveness*, “war as an institution, similarly as a kingdom or a system of officials was a new invention around 3000 years B.C... If we omit desires of kings and their officials for power and fame, war was a consequence of objective conditions under

¹ LUKÁŠEK, Libor: *Fenomén mezinárodního terorismu ve světle současného mezinárodního práva*. Plzeň: Západočeská univerzita, 1999, p. 68 and 70.

which it was useful economically. The institutionalization of war was then increasing and strengthening the human destructiveness and cruelty.”¹ Thus the direct confrontation of state’s armed forces belongs among fatal human activities. No wonder that various scientists of different specializations have been looking for the cause of armed violence in general, and among states specifically. Their research has resulted in theories of various levels, on one hand looking for the causes of wars in the micro-world of policy defined by the biological nature of man, and on the other hand in the macro-world of policy in the form of the general cycles of historical development.

Civilized belligerent powers cannot only blame bio-psychological constants: if war is repeated, it means that also peace is repeated – human nature in a specific constellation is then a cause of war and a cause of peace in a different constellation. Every day experience points out that many people are not aggressive, because their conflict behaviour decreases its intensity immediately after they meet resistance. In general, people do not wish wars – war is only promoted by some social groups and some statesmen that associate their advantages, privileges, and profit with a concrete conflict, whereby they have enough funds to manipulate public opinion.

The idea about monolithic ideology as a source of peace is neither confirmed by the Christian Middle Ages, by fractioning fights among Muslims, nor by previous practices of bureaucratic socialism. The Soviet-Finish war and specifically the armed conflicts between the Soviet Union and China, China and Vietnam, the intervention in Hungary and Czechoslovakia – this all speaks against the notion that socialism automatically means peace. Similar problems are also related to the peacemaking of democracy. According to many researches, democratic states do not like to combat with one another, but they combat as often as other regimes. The ancient democratic Athens was also well-known for belligerence and military cynicism. The democratization of war during the 18th and the 19th centuries led to savageries and brutalities that were unknown in the 17th century. The bloodiest war of American history happened between, according to those day’s notion, democratic units: it was a civil war. The British empire was built up by the most liberal regime of that period. The democratic United States and the monarchist Spain were, to the same extent, involved in the first imperialistic war, the American-Spanish War for the reapportionment of the world. The concentration camps were invented during the war of two relative democracies – during the Boer War. Similarly, World War I was started by the German and Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy (states with representative governments and developed legal systems) – only Masaryk-Wilson’s interpretation made from this was a conflict between democracies and autocracies, whereby the tsarist Russia, “the jail of nations” in general supported the democratic side.

Even modern democracies do not reduce their violence when they make war; their mass culture brings up aggression. If no democracy ever initiated preventive war, what was, for example, the Vietnam war then? None of the states after the end of World War II was involved in so many interventions as the U.S.A. – which does not relate to their liberal-democratic regime, but to their role of superpower and their hegemonic status in the world political system. There is also another problem: Table No. 8, borrowed from the almanac of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), shows that arms are mostly exported by liberal democratic states and imported by states of various regimes.²

Table No. 8: BIGGEST EXPORTERS AND IMPORTERS OF ARMS (2001–2005)
(data in millions of dollars, fixed prices in 1990)

¹ FROMM, Erich: *Anatomie lidské destruktivity. Můžeme ovlivnit její podstatu a následky?* Praha: Nakladatelství Lidové noviny, 1997, p. 166.

² SIPRI Yearbook 2006. *Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 477 and 481.

THE BIGGEST EXPORTERS OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS						
State	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2001-2005
Russia	5548	5656	5567	6440	5771	28 982
U.S.A.	5516	4662	5139	5818	7101	28 236
France	1133	1259	1268	2514	2399	8573
Germany	640	632	1639	837	1855	5603
Great Britain	1070	708	567	797	791	3933
Ukraine	702	281	536	519	188	2226
Canada	110	351	568	577	365	1971
Netherlands	190	249	339	250	840	1868
Italy	185	332	310	204	827	1858
Sweden	459	114	271	324	592	1760
THE BIGGEST IMPORTERS OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS						
State	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2001-2005
China	3142	2647	2096	2761	2697	13 343
India	875	1655	2883	2471	1471	9 355
Greece	709	495	2131	1656	1114	6105
United Arab Emirates	178	194	791	1323	2381	4867
Great Britain	1263	675	698	197	94	2927
Egypt	819	598	520	368	596	2901
Israel	147	239	333	732	1422	2873
Turkey	389	871	570	224	746	2800
South Korea	508	336	401	772	544	2561
Australia	657	459	471	360	396	2343

The justification of the use of violence by enforcing national interests or by the principles of the balance of power, cannot also explain the foreign policy of every state. For example, the former great power, Sweden, has been solving its international conflicts without any war since 1809; similarly Switzerland since 1815. According to some authors, 1/5 of states have not made war since the beginning of the 16th century. It is not too many, but it is a fact. So, there exists different opinions on which of the arrangements of the world political structure elicit war, as the same dissidence exists with regard to the opinions on the balance of power among states. According to Inis Claude, a war is most probable if power is distributed equally – the weak one does not attack if there is an unbalance and furthermore, the weak one will retreat due to pressure, the probability of war only increases with growing equality, whereby “war is part of the negotiation process”; contrary to the above mentioned, Geoffrey Blainey and Abramo Organski are of the opinion that war is most probable if power is divided unequally; according to D. Wittman, the distribution of power has no influence on the probability of war.¹ Empiric tests of cyclic theory has also brought contradicting results: for example Quincy Wright is of the opinion that there is approximately a fifty year interval between the breaking out of wars. Lewis Richardson and Pitirim Sorokin calculated that there is a period of two hundred years from one climax to a second climax of a next cycle; J. David Singer, based on his calculations, concludes that the cyclic theory cannot be proved.

Deterrence

The fact that violence exists as the ultima ratio of international policy, makes war an omnipresent factor; however, it requires two forms, not only as a factual violence, but also as a potential violence. The possibility that the negotiating party will have recourse to violence and thus will enforce a more advantageous solution of conflict, is one of the basic supporting factors for diplomatic negotiations; the possibility of interrupting peace with impunity and violating law is based on the dominance of power. Thus, potential violence acts as a possibil-

¹ See HARISON WAGNER, R.: *Peace, War, and the Balance of Power*. American Political Science Review. Vol. 88, No. 3, September 1994, p. 595.

ity of using power for a peaceful solution to conflict with coercion. Therefore, the strengthening of state power seems to be an inevitable tool of providing for the cooperative solutions of conflicts, because the ability not to surrender to coercion represents a base for manoeuvring in diplomacy as well.

Armed forces are a constant fact of international policy. Their goal is to enforce an opponent to break down their will to resist in the conflict of contradictory interests. As the use of power is always linked with loss – material and human, as a rule – the enforced actions of opponents under the threat of violence, or the deterrence of opponents to use force, can become the most effective use of power. Deterrence is one of two basic functions of armed forces, not less significant than combat itself.

The existence of strategic weapons has provided considerations about nature and function with a new dimension. Deterrence has gradually become the basic function of strategic nuclear weapons; however, it can only fulfil this function if plausibility is manifested in the form of a political will to use strategic weapons. As early as 1945, Bernard Brodie says that the existence of nuclear weapons means the change of the basic objective of armed forces build up: if in the past, the goal was to win wars, *their preventions will have become the main goal since today*¹. He started the retreat from Clausewitz's thesis, according to which war is a tool of achieving political goals. However, the official concept of mass retaliation is based on the prerequisites of the exclusive use of nuclear weapons. If, according to official doctrines, nuclear weapons are considered to be a "sword" originally, with regard to a possibility of the second strike, they change into a "shield". This change of strategic orientation has resulted in a change of the understanding of deterrence also from the regional point of view, and it has disturbed the cohesiveness of NATO. The unanswerable question has been opened to theory, whether the United States would use nuclear weapons if there is an escalation of conflict in Europe, whether Western Europe allies are of such worth to the Americans that they are prepared to risk their own destruction by strategic weapons because of the defence of Europe: "Will Washington commit suicide to save Paris?", asked general Charles de Gaulle.

According to analyses, at the time it was a specific feature of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 that the Soviet Union could not open the whole scale that escalation plays, because they had no technical tools for conventional military pressure in the Caribbean area. Similar restrictions were seen for example, by the head of general staff Charles Ailleret in western forces in Europe: according to his opinion, the dominance of the Warsaw Pact in conventional weapons in the European battlefield in the middle of the 60s was so huge that it would be "a very successful solution if we succeed to stop the Russians at the Rhine river. It would probably only happen at the Somme river and the Aisne river in Vosges mountains, Jura mountains and in the Alps". Such a situation associated with insecurity about the American nuclear shield led France to look for a specific place in nuclear diplomacy. During the 60s, the French Institute of Strategic Studies analysed nuclear risks, which resulted in a remarkable scale:

1. zero risk was understood as a possibility of destroying less than two percent of own sources by an enemy attack, i.e. cities and large agglomerations;
2. acceptable risk oscillated between 10 and up to 15 % of destroyed sources;
3. acceptable risk was only in a situation when a lot that is at stake oscillates between 15 – 50 % of destroyed sources;
4. unacceptable risk, whatever it relates to, is above 50 % of own sources destroyed by an enemy attack.

The stability between the United States and the Soviet Union was related to an unacceptable risk of 50 % sources destroyed by the retaliatory strike. According to these considerations, mutual deterrence operates if the capacity of the second strike is expressed by the ability to

¹ BRODIE, B.: *Implications for Military Policy*. In: *The Absolute Weapon*. Edited by B. Brodie. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1946, p. 74.

destroy 10-15 % of Soviet cities by a retaliatory strike; then, “nuclear stability” should appear. The idea of French nuclear power is based on this calculation. The aim was to ensure deterrence with a threat to superpowers at the boundary of an acceptable risk; according to these calculations sufficient deterrence is of a ratio of 15 : 90 % of destroyed sources, though it is a defensive deterrence.¹ It is probable that Great Britain and China have used similar calculations.

There exist two interpretations of the results of deterrence during the Cold War that are based on two facts: the fact that no world war broke out between the superpowers, and the fact that there was an intensive armament during the whole period of the Cold War. According to one concept, strategic nuclear weapons prevented war with their deterrence effect, according to another theory, peace was kept despite the existence of nuclear rockets. Both concepts have their own persuading strength based on the fact that none of them can be either proved or refuted.

At the beginning of the 21st century, opinions emerged in the United States that nuclear deterrence has ceased to work. With regard to the modernization of the U.S.’s nuclear arsenal after the end of the Cold War, as well as to the build up of the National Missile Defence (NMD), the nuclear superiority of the U.S.A. over Russia and China is such that it allows the first disarmament strike. According to available information, this standpoint has not become part of official strategy, but it is one of the reasons for the acceleration of the Russian arsenal of strategic weapons. The building of NMD itself, and the necessity of preventative wars, is justified in Bush’s official doctrine by the fact that deterrence does not work against so called “rogue states”, because they are willing to risk and they are prepared to gamble the lives of their own people and the wealth of nations.

Armament

From the middle of 1930s, the tempo of growth in military expenses has exceeded the growth of population, economy, and even prices.² With regard to the existence of strategic weapons, there is another fact added as an accompanying argument, that next time it will not be possible to rely on the conversion of the civil industry into military production, for example, as it happened in the U.S.A.’s transfer to military production only after the breaking out of World Wars I and II. The “hit and run” war, and the existence of strategic weapons, exclude armament after breaking out of combats. Therefore, arsenals, and at least arsenals of strategic weapons, should already be at the level of sufficiency during peace.

The classical arguments either for justifying armament, or for its stoppage, are always repeated when a campaign to stop nuclear weapon tests appears. This was the case during the years 1995 and 1996, when criticism was mainly focused on France and China. Sharp voices in opposition were heard not only from the Pacific area, which had experienced the use of nuclear weapons and which was also the region where tests were realized, but there were also critical remarks from other nuclear great powers. However, statistics prove that from July 16, 1945 to October 9, 2006, when the last known test was realized, a total of 2051 nuclear tests were executed – whereby the United States executed more than half of them. The record number of nuclear tests was registered in 1962, when total of 178 nuclear tests were executed in the world. Table No. 9 shows how – according to data of the American association for the control of armament – individual nuclear great powers participated in these tests.³ The table shows and confirms the paradoxical logic of the security dilemma. The surprising results from

¹ See HANDL, M.: *Francouzská kritika a její slábnutí*. In: *Omezené války*. Praha: Naše vojsko, 1971, p. 75 and 80–81.

² KEGLEY, Charles W., Jr., WITTKOPF, Eugene R.: *World Politics. Trends and Transformation*. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993, p. 396.

³ Arms Control Association – <http://www.armscontrol.org/facts/>

the Indian and Pakistani tests in 1998, and including methods of parallel explosions, indicates that there can exist unknown nuclear arsenals.

Table No. 9: NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS, 1945 – 2006

STATE	U.S.A.	USSR	BRITAIN	FRANCE	CHINA	INDIA	PAKISTAN	NORTH KOREA
The first / the last test	1945 / 1992	1949 / 1990	1952 / 1991	1960 / 1996	1964 / 1996	1974 / 1998	1998 / 1998	2006 / 2006
Total of tests	1030	715	45	210	45	3 (6) *	2 (6) *	1

* According to the definition of nuclear test in the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, parallel explosions are considered to be one test. However, on May 11, 1998, India executed three parallel explosions and two on May 13 of the same year and then Pakistan executed five parallel test on May 28, 1998.

The arguments supporting tests with nuclear weapons were very similar in all the great powers:

- to keep the credibility of deterrence policy, which in the context of the balance of power policy can be sometimes understood as a peaceful activity focused on blocking a potential enemy;
- to control the standard of storing, which according to the same concept is a humanitarian activity to ensure nuclear safety;
- to test new types of weapons.

The analyses of the SIPRI points out that military expenses started to grow again, at the end of the decade after the Cold War – the lowest expenses during the period after the Cold War were recorded in 1998, then the increase started, which also continued in 2005. In the year 2005, global military expenses reached the amount of 1,118 milliard dollars in common prices, which in average represented 173 dollars per one inhabitant on Earth. Military expenses comprised 2.5 % of the world gross domestic product. During the decade of 1996 to 2005, military expenses increased in the world by 34 %. In 2005, the process of military expense concentration was going on, i.e. the number of countries responsible for the increase in expenses. According to Table No. 10, originally published in the almanac of SIPRI, the highest military expenses fall on the U.S.A. – the military expenses of the U.S.A. comprises 48% of the world expenses; Great Britain, France, Japan, and China come after, whereby each of them is responsible for 4–5 % of the world military expenses. The United States is also responsible for 80 % of the year on year growth between 2004/2005.

These analyses of the SIPRI points out that at the beginning of the 21st century, the United States definitely confirmed its role of hegemon as well as the determination to fulfil it in the future. Russia aligned its expenses with other European great powers. A dramatic growth, if its military expenses during the past period can be attributed to the rejection of the romantic approach to international policy due to the activities of NATO in the Balkans. Table No. 10 also shows that Chinese expenses for armament far from confirm the considerations that the superpower that is being born has global military ambitions.¹

Table No. 10: STATES WITH THE GREATEST MILITARY EXPENSES IN 2005
(in milliards of dollars, in fixed prices in 2003)

ACCORDING TO EXCHANGE RATES	ACCORDING TO PURCHASING
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¹ SIPRI Yearbook 2006. *Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2006, p. 302 and 299.

				POWER PARITY	
state	expenses	per capita expenses	share (%) of world expenses	state	expenses
U.S.A.	478.2	1 604	48	U.S.A.	478.2
Great Britain	48.3	809	5	China	[188.4]
France	46.2	763	5	India	105.8
Japan	42.1	329	4	Russia	[64.4]
China	[41.0]	[31.2]	[4]	France	45.4
sub-total of five	655.7		65	sub-total of five	882.3
Germany	33.2	401	3	Great Britain	42.3
Italy	27.2	468	3	Saudi Arabia	35.0
Saudi Arabia	25.2	1 025	3	Japan	34.9
Russia	[21.0]	[147]	[2]	Germany	32.7
India	20.4	18.5	2	Italy	30.1
sub-total of ten	782.7		78	sub-total of ten	1 057.2
South Korea	16.4	344	2	Brazil	24.3
Canada	10.6	327	1	Iran	23.8
Australia	10.5	522	1	South Korea	23.4
Spain	9.9	230	1	Turkey	17.8
Israel	9.6	1 430	1	Tai-wan	13.4
sub-total of fifteen	839.8		84	sub-total of fifteen	1 159.8
Total of world	1 001	155	100		

According to available data, the world export of arms in 2004 reached the amount of USD 44–53 milliard, i.e. 0.5 up to 0.6 % of overall world trade. During 2001 up to 2005, the biggest exporters of arms were Russia, the U.S.A., France, Germany, and Great Britain. The European Union as a whole, holds the third place following Russia and the U.S.A., whereby each of them exported approximately 30 % of arms. During this period, 43 % of Russian exports went to China and 25 % to India; the biggest customers of weapons from the U.S.A. were Greece, Israel, Great Britain, and Egypt. In 2005, the five biggest exporters covered 80 % of all deliveries. The above mentioned data shows that the world trade in arms could not exist in general without the permanent members of the UN Security Council.

So called small arms and light weapons represent a special article of the trade with arms, that come under minimum international regulations. In materials of the United Nations that have devoted their whole attention to the issue of the black market since 2001, we can find the definitions according to which:

- Small arms are determined for individual use – for example revolvers and pistols, rifles, sub-machine guns, and machine rifles;
- Light weapons are determined for a group use by small crews and they are transported on light vehicles or with teams – for example heavy machine guns, mortars with calibre smaller than 100 mm, bomb throwers, mobile anti-aircraft and antitank weapons, and mobile launch platforms for rockets.

According to a Geneva research centre's Small Arms Survey, at present, there are 640 arms of this type, whereby more than 200 million or less are in the hands of armies; and more than 26 million of institutions enforcing law. Almost 2/3 of arms are kept by civilians all over the world, and from 60 to 90% of direct victims of conflicts can be attributed to small arms and light weapons. Though it is difficult to keep statistical data about this topic – and various research centres state different data – according to this survey, in 2003, from 80 to 108 thousand people were killed by these arms.¹ Others state half a million of people killed with small arms and light weapons annually (including murders, etc.).

¹ See *Small Arms Survey 2006. Unfinished Business*. Oxford: Oxford University Presp. 2006.

Almost half of the numbers of small arms get from one place of conflict to another by being smuggled. It is estimated that 40 % – 50 % of small arms trade is illegal. As far as legal trade is concerned, and it is a bigger half of the trade, many arms can find their way to the black market; also the arms purchased from secret services of various states also represent one source of the black market. These arms are relatively cheap – in some countries, it is possible to buy an automatic AK-47 “kalašnikov” for a bag of corn or USD 20 – 30.

Goals of War

According to the classic Clausewitz's definition “war is a continuation of policy by different means”.¹ War is organized violence among armed social groups, whose aim is either to destroy an opponent physically, or to undermine his will to defend his original interests. In other words, the physical conflict of organized armed groups is the essence of war. Its beginnings can be traced in the ancient conflicts of tribes and in the ritual vendetta; today, they fall in a large scale from the various versions of total war up to revolutionary partisan movements. War between states then has the form of the efforts of armies to disarm, or to destroy a competitive state, and in this way to achieve an advantage for negotiations resulting from the fact that the opponent cannot use force. This concept sees war through the eyes of the balance of power's politicians as a failure of diplomacy – and vice versa. As war represent the sharpest form of social conflict, in modern times, combats of armed groups are accompanied by political, diplomatic, and propagandistic fights.

Empirical data related to the number of wars among states, and their consequences, differ depending on methodology. According to the well-known research of Michigan University and J. David Singer, there are many other calculations. For example, according to Ruth Sivard, from the year 1500 to the beginning of the 1920s, there were a total of 589 wars, whereby 141,901,000 people died. From the beginning of the 17th century, the number of wars and the number of people killed has been increasing, whereby the tempo of the increase in the killed is faster than the number of the increase in the number of inhabitants. During nine decades of the 20th century, more people died during wars than during the previous four centuries.² In general, the methodology of J. David Singer and Melvin Small from Michigan University has been accepted – i.e. at least the concept of war as a conflict during which at least one thousand people died per year. Table No. 11 shows, what was the frequency of wars like, according to this research, after the defeat of Napoleon up to the end of the Cold War, and what was the structure of the 181 counted wars according to individual historical stages. According to these calculations since 1945, 18.2 million of people died during interstate wars, whereby 75 % of wars were between small states and not between great powers.³

Table No. 11: WARS BETWEEN STATES DURING 1816 – 1988

PERIOD	NUMBER OF WARS	AVERAGE NUMBER OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
1816-1848	33	28
1849-1881	43	39
1882-1914	33	40
1915-1944	24	59
1945-1988	43	117

¹ CLAUSEWITZ, Carl P. G.: *O válce*. Praha: Naše vojsko, 1959, p. 36.

² SIVARD, Ruth L.: *World Military and Social Expenditures 1991*. Washington D. C., World Priorities, 1991, p. 20.

³ KEGLEY, Charles W., Jr., WITTKOPF, Eugene R.: *World Politics. Trends and Transformation*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993, p. 437.

When using the statistical-historical analysis in the book *Peace and war: armed conflicts and international order 1648–1989*, Kalevi Holsti works with a similar definition of war as that of J. David Singer. However, his analyses is focused on looking for political causes of wars with the help of the studies of 177 wars and big military interventions. Table No. 12 shows the frequency of the individual causes of wars during the selected periods of the world policy system development according to this author.¹ Of course, we could polemize with the categorization of causes, but this Table provides us with the basic orientation regarding some changes of the world political system: it shows when dynastic wars disappeared, it monitors a decrease in the importance of territory in power relations, though the establishment of new states from colonial empires increased the frequency of this topic during the period 1945 to 1989 in some respect; it shows the penetration of the national topic among the causes of war after the Napoleon Wars, the links between the frequency of trade wars and raw material causes, colonisation causes, etc.; however, the fact that wars due to “religious solidarity” disappeared, as shown in the Table, seem to be a problem of the definition.

Table No. 12: FREQUENCY OF PROBLEMATIC TOPICS RESULTING IN WARS

PROBLEMATIC TOPICS	1648-1714	1715-1814	1815-1914	1918-1941	1945-1989
territory	24	26	14	14	8
strategic territory	10	7	4	9	7
boundary territories	-	1	-	-	3
national liberation /establishment of state	2	3	10	4	9
national union /consolidation	-	1	9	-	6
splitting off/ establishment of state	-	-	-	-	2
creation of empire	0	4	3	6	-
trade / free seas	16	14	4	-	1
trade/resources	2	-	-	6	3
colonial competition	4	4	1	-	-
protection of national interests /trade interests	-	-	1	5	3
religious solidarity	6	4	3	-	-
ethnical solidarity	-	-	5	2	3
ethnical/religious/ unification/separation	-	-	2	5	4
defence/support of ally	2	4	-	3	5
ideological liberation	-	1	3	3	4
character of government	-	5	4	5	9
keeping of the integrity of state /empire	-	3	18	9	9
enforcement of treaty	6	3	1	9	2
keeping of regional superiority	-	-	3	2	2
dynastic succession	14	9	3	-	-
keeping of state / regime	10	7	2	11	7
autonomy	-	1	2	2	2
balance of power	4	1	1	1	1

Total war

The last two centuries changed the form of wars – their “democratization” associated with secular ideologies, specifically with nationalism, resulted not only in the increase in live forces, but also in innovated military technique. The conflicts that rejected the etiquette of dynas-

¹ HOLSTI, Kalevi J.: *Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648–1989*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1992, p. 307.

tic warfare, have risen more sharply and determined the goals that threaten the existence of the state and regimes. This setting of maximum forces in association with the absolute objectives of war is named the total war. With regard to this fact, the relations of two states can be placed on the scale from the harmonious identity of interest to the various forms of cooperation, from the conflicts of less importance up to a total war; the total war represents the sharpest form of conflict. European great powers were afraid of such wars with regard to the Great French revolution and after the defeat of Napoleon – it was one motive why this type of the balance of power was practiced as it is known from the European Concert.

Total war is not a French invention. In ancient times and in middle ages, war was very often made with the participation of all society members and with cruelty not only leading to the destruction of opponent political organizations, but also to the whole hostile social group. Specifically, conflict for hegemony tends to have the character of total war (i.e. wars made in bipolar structure with a relative power balance) – as it was in the case of the Peloponnesian Wars, the Punic Wars, the Thirty Years' War, during the Napoleonic Wars, and the Word Wars. Such hegemonic total wars are typical for their terrible cruelty, large geographical extent, and the long period of duration. Specifically, World War II emphasized this concept, when combat was made with the use of all destructive forces (with the exception of combat gasses that were only used by the Japanese – but as the weapons of mass destruction, their effects were replaced and multiplied by the American use of nuclear bombs), with the participation of the armies of states from all continents, with the goal of the unconditional capitulation of combating parties and regimes; furthermore, it culminated with the trials of leaders of the defeated party (with the exception of Japanese emperors). This concept of total war has become the forcible warning for the period following the year 1945.

The period of the Cold War was not only associated with the memories from the World War II horrors, but also with the new revolutionary technical characteristics of the military tools of destruction and the possibilities of understanding their use. As the questions of the development of weapon systems and the development of doctrinal thinking remained hidden in the Soviet Union, the examples that are necessary to understand the changes of war understanding since 1945 can only be stated with reference to American sources. We can only assume that the Soviet way of this development understanding was similar to a certain extent. The starting point of all changes was represented by the revolution of the military during the second half of the 40s and during the 50s. It results in:

- the emergence and improvement of the weapons of mass destruction;
- the development of nuclear and thermonuclear bombs carriers – specifically missiles;
- the mechanizations and automation of the equipment of military forces control and administrative command, including intelligence means;
- the fast alteration of the generations of weapons and control systems, strategic systems, as well as conventional systems.

Strategic weapons are capable of fulfilling the final goals of wars with one strike. The self-justification of armament got a new “logical” impulse: weapons became useful just for the first minutes of war; in case of strategic weapons, the supplemental armament after the start of war could not be considered. Though at the beginning, the apocalyptic picture of total nuclear war was seen in black colours, the technical side of its ensuring had three basic forms and also stages to a certain extent: the quantitative and qualitative development of nuclear carriers and the efforts to overcome nuclear missiles stalemate. The spiral of race in strategic armament was moving along the line: nuclear bomb (1945) – strategic bombers (1948) – thermonuclear bomb (1952) – intercontinental ballistic missiles (1957) – missile submarines (1960) – anti-missile defence systems (1958) –multiple missile reentry vehicles and multiple independent reentry vehicles (1960 MRV, 1970 MIRV) – cruise missiles (1971) – new medium-range missiles (1979) – mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (1987).

WARHEADS

The nuclear bomb thrown down on Hiroshima represents the base of the total nuclear war picture – specifically the destruction of a city agglomeration with one bomb, a so-called nominal bomb with the strength equalling 20 kilotons TNT. The ownership of nuclear weapons started to determine the position in the hierarchy of states, international prestige; it helped to define power, table No. 9 shows the data about the first and the last nuclear tests of all states from 1945 to 2000 as well as the total numbers. Six countries have gradually announced that they own nuclear weapons; however, in 1974 the CIA announced that Israel also owns nuclear weapons. According to some data, in 1993 South Africa confirmed that they own nuclear weapons, but they would stop their nuclear program and they would destroy their arsenal of six nuclear bombs;¹ three from legal successors of the Soviet Union, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belorussia, and would voluntarily renounce nuclear weapons. Table No. 13 originally published in the Yearbook of SIPRI, shows the current number of nuclear weapons owned by great powers at the beginning of 2006. The Table shows that in 2006, there were more than nine thousand strategic nuclear weapons.² As far as the so-called unofficial nuclear states is concerned (i.e. those that were not the participants to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons from the year 1967), it is not clear whether they are operational and whether these are strategic or tactical warheads – their number is only estimated based on the calculation of available fissionable material.

Table No. 13: NUCLEAR INVENTORIES (JANUARY 2006)

STATE ^a	STRATEGIC WARHEADS	TACTICAL WARHEADS	TOTAL
U.S.A.	5021	500	5521 ^b
Russia	3352	2 330	5682 ^c
France	348	-	348
Great Britain	185 ^d	-	185
China	~130	? ^e	~130
India	-	-	~50 ^f
Pakistan	-	-	~60 ^f
Israel	-	-	100–200
total	-	-	~12 100

Notes: *a* In 2005, North Korea announced that they have usable nuclear weapons, but this information cannot be verified. *b* The total arsenal of the U.S.A., including reserves, comprises 10 thousand. *c* The complete arsenal of the Russian Federation comprises approximately 16 thousand, thereof 10 100 is either a reserve, or they are in liquidation. *d* some missiles in British strategic submarines have tactical tasks. *e* The existence of Chinese tactical nuclear weapons has not been confirmed by official sources. *f* The inventories of India, Pakistan, and Israel are only partially usable by carriers.

Since the start of the first nuclear bomb's existence, their improvement has been realized, whereby the fundamental jump with regard to their destruction strength has been represented by the emergence of thermonuclear weapons – the first American thermonuclear explosion in November 1952 had the strength of approximately 10 megatons TNT, the first American nuclear bomb from 1954 corresponded to 15 megatons TNT; in 1961, the Soviet Union tested a thermonuclear bomb with a strength of 61 megaton (i.e. the equivalent of 61, 000, 000 tons TNT). Beside the maximizing of explosions focused on general destruction, there was also the minimizing process focused on the precision of destruction; scientists invented bombs with

¹ HOLSTI, Kalevi J.: *International Politics.. A Framework for Analysis*. – Seventh edition. – Englewood Cliffs: Prentice – Hall International, Inc., 1995, p. 218.

² SIPRI Yearbook 2006. *Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 640.

artificially prolonged life-threatening radioactivity of precipitation, so called “clear neutron bomb”.

According to the analysis of Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen, worked out for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, in the middle of 2006 nine states owned approximately 27 thousand nuclear bombs; thereof 97 % belonged to the U.S.A. and Russia. However, this threatening arsenal was only a part of what was there at the end of the Cold War – in 1986, the number of nuclear warheads exceeded 70 thousand. According to these authors, since 1945 there has been more than 128 thousand nuclear warheads, thereof 55 % in the U.S.A. and 43 % in the USSR or Russia.¹

At the same time, beside nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction were improved during the Cold War – chemical and biological arms. These are just chemical and biological arms that require relatively small expenses for manufacture “nuclear arms of the poor” – according to some estimates, probably 20 countries of the third world own chemical arms and four states biological arms. These were just chemical arms that were at the beginning, as well as at the end, of the use of the weapons of mass destruction during wars – in World War I., they caused the death of 100 thousand soldiers and the injury of one million; they also were the arms of the “forgotten war” in the Persian Gulf, the war between Iraq and Iran during the years 1980 – 1988.

CARRIERS

The original carrier of strategic bomb was a strategic bomber – the first one was an American strategic bomber with large flying range B-36 from the year 1948. The so-called “pactomania”, as part of strategic forces, is associated with its role – the original flying range of strategic bombers required to built up American military bases around the border of the Soviet Union. Only at the end of the 50s, a new carrier type – ballistic rocket- appeared. The introduction of these rockets meant a dramatic change – they diverted the balance between defence and attack in favour of an attacker. The strategic rocket was gradually improved in two basic forms – intercontinental ballistic missile and missiles launched from submarines. Submarines with nuclear drive linked with Polaris missiles represented the first strategic system that was required and recommended with regard to the problem of mobility, i.e. looking for manoeuvre in total nuclear war. Thus, the strategic triad originated, three basic types of strategic weapons:

- Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) have the largest destruction capacity. They are launched from ground bases, they fly along ballistic trajectory and their range is minimum 5,500 km.
- Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) are the least vulnerable part of the triad.
- Strategic air-forces with nuclear bombs are the most flexible with regard to political manoeuvring.

The triad itself was complemented with two systems in the 80s that can also be used to reach the strategic goals of war with a single strike: cruise missiles and intermediate-range ballistic missiles.

- Cruise missiles have no rocket engine and ballistic trajectory, however due to their accuracy and warhead strength, they can, if connected with bombers, fulfil the strategic goals of war. They can either be launched from ground bases, ships, submarines, or aircrafts.
- Intermediate- range ballistic missiles (IRBM) are the ballistic missiles, whose range is between 2,500 to 5,500 km. They can carry bigger warheads than cruise missiles, whereby they keep accuracy, and furthermore, they add velocity to a possible attack. These missiles

¹ NORRIS, R. S., KRISTENSEN, H. M.: *Global nuclear stockpiles, 1945-2006*. In: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2006.

were destroyed in accordance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty signed between the U.S.A. and the USSR in 1987.

The development of missiles was originally focused on most possible capacity, later on accuracy. In 1967, the number of carriers was stabilized, and on one hand, the defence of strategic forces and on the other hand, the multiple warheads, became a “hit”. The radical turning point was represented by placing several charges into one warhead (MRV system) and later independent navigation of these warheads to various targets or along various trajectories (MIRV system); some submarine missiles could carry up to 14 such independently navigated warheads (Poseidon). So-called heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles were decommissioned based on the treaty START II., but there are still holders of records: the American LGM-118A Peacekeeper had the range of 9.7 thousand km and carried the warhead weighing 3,950 kg; i.e. 10 warheads equalling 300 kilotons TNT in the system of MIRV; the Russian missile SS-18 Satan could fly up to 15,2 thousand km with warhead of 24.5 megatons TNT, or 38 warheads, each of them 250 kilotons TNT, or 15 up to 17 megatons; during half an hour it could bring 25 megatons TNT.

The number of strategic carriers of nuclear warheads, that great powers located at the beginning of 2006, are shown in Table No. 14, which was worked out according to SIPRI source.¹ According to the Table it is obvious that the Soviet Union and Russia currently have no competitors in the world in the sphere of strategic weapons. Something similar can be said about China that commenced a huge missile and cosmic program in 2000; according to American estimates, the system MIRV should be implemented for Chinese missiles in 2010. In case of Israel, Pakistan, and India, data of SIPRI about carriers are vague. Table 18. shows the estimated changes in the strategic triad of the U.S.A. and Russia with respect to the number of warheads.

Table No.14: STRATEGIC CARRIERS OF NUCLEAR GREAT POWERS
(January 2006)

STATE	ICBM	SLBM	BOMBERS	TOTAL
U.S.A.	500	336	72	908
Russia	512	192	78	782
France	-	48	84*	132
Great Britain	-	48	-	48
China	79	12	~23	~121

* including 24 aircrafts from aircraft carrier armed with nuclear warheads.

The intensive development of the military technique of great powers resulted in strategic stalemate – the possibility of the second strike emerged. The idea of the second strike presupposes that each of the superpowers, if attacked by surprise and with the maximum force of enemy, will surely preserve such amount of strategic weapons to destroy the opponent in a return strike. Discussions about this topic started at the end of D. Eisenhower's presidency, i.e. after launching the Soviet sputnik. In this context, some military-political categories were newly. The sensitive balance of terror started to be discussed and deterrence started to be understood as an ability to strike secondly. The “mutual assured destruction”, MAD, appeared; MAD means the situation when the relation between an offensive and a defensive is definitely deflected in favour of the offensive.

The technical side of defence, and thus also deterrence, acquired the image of the invulnerability of the second strike system. R. McNamara, the ministry of defence in the government of J. F. Kennedy, introduced the term “assured destruction” – according to his concept, the

¹ Ibid., p. 641–659.

assurance was given by the ability of the second strike to kill 20 – 25 % of inhabitants and 50 % of the Soviet Union's industry; particularly, as it related to the need to launch 400 nuclear warheads of the individual equivalent of one megaton TNT. At the end of the 60s, the other US minister of defence, M. Laird, attributed the factor of effectiveness 80 % to Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles; which meant that eight from ten Soviet missiles could strike a selected target in the U.S.A. with sufficient accuracy.

With regard to this mathematics, in the middle of the 70s, the theory of the window of vulnerability, with respect to the U.S.A., originated. The problem of this vision was that it was the U.S.A. that started to implement the system of MIRV – firstly in 1970 with intercontinental ballistic missiles, Minuteman III., the following year, the MIRV system was implemented to Poseidon missiles in submarines. The Soviet Union executed the first tests of MIRV system only in August 1973. It was remarkable that the treaty, SALT I, did not devote any attention to this incoming technology. This omission and the following American initiative damaged the effectiveness and the credibility of armament control. At the same time, the vulnerability of intercontinental ballistic missiles did not equal the vulnerability of the United States, because the triad was built up spontaneously, but every element was perceived in the doctrine so independently that it was capable of "assured destruction". Furthermore, at that time Soviet military philosophy was focused on city targets, but the American concept was on strategic weapons.

The program of Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), known as the program of "star wars", was officially announced by Ronald Reagan in March 1983, only with the aim to wall in the "window of vulnerability". At the beginning of the 20th century, the U.S. program of the National Missile Defense (NMD) represented a new variant of the SDI system. This time it is not justified by the vision of the window of vulnerability – because intercontinental ballistic missiles with MIRV system were, both in Russian and the U.S.A., were eliminated based on the treaty START II. The wide program of antimissile defence with the use of satellites is newly defended by the fact that it is necessary to respond to the changes in the world. Though, it became less dangerous after the end of the Cold War, according to the words of George Bush, it is "less sure and less predictable". Officially, it should be a shield against Russian and Chinese missiles, but it should create the potential for the liquidation of long-range missiles from "antagonistically tuned countries" that have not had them so far, for example North Korea and Iran (originally also Iraq).

It is presupposed that during the years 2004 to 2009, 53 milliard dollars will be invested into NMD, which makes it the most expensive budgeted program of the Pentagon. As far as the European countries are concerned, Great Britain and Denmark provided their territories for NMD; in August 2006, a group of experts from the Pentagon visited the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary to negotiate the possibilities of locating bases of NMD in some of these countries.

In the beginning, the program of NMD was in contradiction with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty). Therefore, the government of George Bush, despite protests from some European allies, Russia, and China, withdrew from it: in June 2002, six month after its withdrawal, the treaty expired. Though soldiers perceive the improvement of defence as a prerequisite for a safer attack, it is natural that the continuance of NMD program was perceived by the states as Russia and China as a danger for themselves. Russia responded by announcing a new program for the development and manufacture of intercontinental ballistic missiles, whereby it is presupposed that apart from launching from mobile bases, they will not follow an absolute ballistic trajectory to target. Furthermore, voices were heard that as a response to the withdrawal from the ABM treaty and the whole NMD program, they recommend that Russia withdraw from the treaty on the elimination of middle-range missiles, though cruise missiles could be sufficient to destroy, for example, the bases of

NMD in Central Europe. A stabilizing solution could be represented by the redefinition of American NMD program's targets that would internationalize the whole program. It means that apart from the defence of the U.S. territory, it would also include the protection of Europe, including Russia, but also the other great powers, specifically China and India, whereby the political and scientific-technological cooperation of these centres of power would be also included into the project.

Limited War

Yet Carl Clausewitz states that if politics makes its tool from war, then war can be "something, what is war once less, once more". Thus he also opened the basic problem of the today's concept of limited war: how to limit the political goals of war? Because the basic difference between total war and limited war is in the political goals of war. Using again the of Clausewitz's words, "the more powerful and stronger the incentives of war are, the more they include the whole existence of nations, the stronger is the tension preceding war, the more war is getting closer to its abstract image, the more it will be the case that the enemy should be defeated, the more the goal coincides with the political purpose, the more the political goal comes forward, the less the political character of war goes back. However, the weaker the incentives and tension, the less will be the natural direction of combating element (i.e. violence), and the less that they will coincide with the specifications determined by politics, and therefore it will be more demanding to divert war from its natural direction; the more the political purpose differs from the goal of ideal war, the more it seems that war acquires it's political nature."¹

In the after war strategic thinking, the term "limited war" was probably firstly used during the investigation of the activities of general, Douglas MacArthur in Congress. Then, George Marshall answered the question of how he would characterize the combats in Korea, whether it is a police action or war: "I would label this conflict as a limited war and I hope that it will remain limited war." However, there were limited wars in the past as well. In the past, there were wars not only for joining a foreign country or the elimination of some ethnic group, but also for example, for the right to fish in some river. Today, we can think of total nuclear war, but also war as a tool to force an enemy to negotiate, to achieve a compromise, to compromise an enemy or allies, to strengthen the authority of international organizations, etc. According to this concept, some moral or legal norms are not the base for the restrictions of war's political goals, but they are the specifications of the effective combination of political goal's hierarchy with power potential. This combination results in today's concept of limited war that limits military operations:

- from the point of view of political goals;
- from the point of view of geography;
- from the point of view of used military means.

The restricted use of force can have various motives. The Middle Ages also had their armed conflicts, when the feudal nobles only demonstrated their power with the purpose of scaring an enemy. It can be even said that total wars, with regard to material expenses and risk, were exceptional; in general, these conflicts were only hegemonic or religious-ideological conflicts. It is important that even the biggest military conflicts, until the 20th century, were restricted objectively in some sense: there were no technical means for geographically unrestricted war. World war with countries of all continents involved in one armed conflict is the achievement of the 20th century that gave limited war a new subjective dimension – apart from others, wars are restricted because their restriction is decided by the great powers that have potentials for worldwide confrontation. Only the second half of the 20th century gave

¹ CLAUSEWITZ, Carl P. G.: *O válce*. Praha: Naše vojsko, 1959, p. 533 and 37.

total war an absolute dimension due to its huge military potential: according to qualified estimates and calculations, such phenomena as radioactive precipitation or nuclear winter can give war, and its consequences, a really global dimension and eliminates from the world map places that would not be affected by war otherwise.

The idea of mutual assured destruction, deprived total war of the possibility to define rational goals: thermonuclear world war has been a recipe for suicide, not a tool for the realization of national interests. The doctrine of mass retaliation showed this stalemate bare – the use of strength for example in the Korea War, either was in contradiction with the doctrine of limited war, or it only could be a potential as a deterrence in the form of political balancing on the edge of world thermonuclear war. The idea of limited war was returning foreign policy as a possibility of using military forces as a rational tool of policy. Due to the influence of this idea, international policy has been militarized and reversely, war has been politicized even more. This has resulted in nothing else, but in the increase in the importance of power. Robert Osgood even attributed the theory and strategy of limited war as “the central role in the U.S. foreign policy.”¹

The concept of limited war does not exclude total world war. It was understood from the beginning as a variant of the use of force and the whole scale of possible armed battles, from “non-standard” activities of espionage institutions, through partisan or revolutionary wars of small brigades, or counter-partisan wars of small divisions up to total world conflict. It is just the possibility of escalation which represents a basic tool to restrict political goals in the concept of limited war: the threat of applying greater power and the threat to extend the conflict geographically forces the enemy to more strict discipline. The problem is in the fact that limited war between superpowers – or war on behalf of – requires that both parties wish the restriction of targets, it requires “cooperation”. Only the uninterrupted calculation of changing risks – calculations of whether the value about which the conflict is about is worth human, material, and moral sources – press upon conflicting parties to restrict political goals. The possibility of escalation is a basic tool of deterrence under the conditions when not only general total world conflict is considered. In other words, deterrence itself is a structured category, its comprehensive image expressed in the foreign policy of superpowers – it presupposes an ability to make total destructive war in some situations, limited war in others.

The Indochina War in which the U.S.A. was involved from the beginning of the 60s up to 1975, has become a model example of limited war. The escalation of conflict itself by the American side varied: more and more soldiers were sent to war – from advisors (in December 1961, the first 400 American soldiers in uniforms arrived to South Vietnam) up to the contingent of 541 thousand soldiers in 1969; the escalation also meant geographically extending from South Vietnam to Laos and Cambodia at the beginning of the 70s, but also to the north to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Apart from the classical partisan war, there were not only used the means of physical liquidation of political representatives of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam by the secret service, but also classical carpet bombing of cities, including the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong, and the barrier of strategic bombers, B-52, whereby the bombing approached a distance of 16 km from the Chinese border. Chemical weapons were also used, etc. 57,685 Americans died and 153,303 were injured. Total direct American expenses are estimated in the amount of USD 140.6 milliard, whereby including additional expenses, for example for American veterans, until 1990, the Vietnam war cost a total of USD 190 milliard. This massive and escalated conflict resulted in the defeat of the superpower, in its “Vietnam syndrome”, at home and the lost of prestige abroad.

There were several reasons for defeat. First of all, it came in sight that in the beginning of involvement, there was a wide-spread notion of monolith communism that was deforming the

¹ OSGOOD, Robert E.: *Limited War Revisited*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1979, p. 4.

idea of withholding communism. The vision of national liberation movement and social revolution, as a clear exported plot of Moscow, resulted in the conflict escalating wrong. The FNL, or North Vietnam, was not the main political opponent for the American concept of limited war in Vietnam, but the Soviet Union: the escalation of military involvement was perceived as the increasing of political pressure on Moscow (or Beijing) that should restrain Vietnam revolutionaries. However, the Soviet Union was not “fulfilling this role“ (Henry Kissinger), or was not fulfilling it sufficiently. The Vietnamese anti-American fighters applied their concept of peoples’ war to such an extent and so thoroughly that the relativity of the whole concept of limited war came in sight. Freedom was inseparable for Ho Chi Min, i.e. the goals of war were also absolute- total. The combination of “limited and total wars” resulted in the death of two million Vietnamese people and three million injured. Approximately 12 million Indochinese inhabitants became refugees. Even such “restricted” horrors did not result in military solutions for the U.S.A. and their allies. Domestic American support was not calculated right as well as the support by the allies. The national interest that was used by the American President Lyndon Johnson to justify war, was not strong enough to excuse the extent and duration of combats, loss, and expenses for war by the Americans. Furthermore, the US army was not prepared adequately at that time.

Based on this knowledge, to which also many American political scientists came to, a logical conclusion was deduced: the strategy of limited war was wrongly applied in Vietnam. Stated by Robert Osgood, his words henceforth and during the rest of the Cold War were applicable *if deterrence remained the core of the U.S. foreign policy, the strategy of limited war will become the key part of the U.S. military strategy, as far as the United States will have their vital interests overseas that must be defended with military forces in the end.*¹ The United States learnt a lesson from this unsuccessful application of limited war and during the following ten years they did not let themselves be involved in long lasting and expensive conflicts against determined opponents. Contrary to this, fifteen years after the American defeat, the Soviet Union let itself be involved in the war against the Muslim fundamentalist mujahedins in Afghanistan that unbelievably resembled the logic of Indo-China War; in the middle of 80s, the Soviet Union had 118 thousand soldiers, more than three million refugees left the country – and despite it, the Soviet Union sustained a defeat.

The key question regarding the restricted use of available weapons had already been asked by the commander of the American troops in the Korea War, Douglas MacArthur, with his requirement to throw nuclear bombs in the south of China: can nuclear weapons be a means of limited war? The concept of limited war in the middle of the 50s was supported by Henry Kissinger and by many other theorists. Together they refused the idea that the existence of nuclear weapons had eliminated the possibility of the use of power and force in foreign policy. Kissinger considered limited nuclear war to be the strategic doctrine that gave diplomacy the highest freedom for actions; restricted nuclear is of the greatest deterrence value, because it does not achieve “maximum trustworthy threat”. According to his opinion at that time, limited nuclear war could be kept within limited boundaries, and under specific conditions, it could cause less harm than a conventional war. It should be a combination of diplomacy and power, accompanied with efforts to avoid the horrors of nuclear war. And primarily: *Limited nuclear war represents our most effective strategy against nuclear great powers or the great power that is able to replace technology with human forces.*² Though Henry Kissinger later gave in to “logical extremism” to justify the idea of limited war with the concept of limited nuclear war, this idea was again renewed when the system of MIRV had been implemented to American strategic missiles.

¹ Ibid., p. 87.

² KISSINGER, Henry A.: *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*. New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1958, p. 158 and 166.

Limited nuclear war can also be made with some nuclear submarines that are not equipped with ballistic missiles. Today, there are approximately two hundred nuclear submarines cruise under the level of world oceans; this role could in particular be fulfilled by new offensive submarines. They are not determined to fulfil the strategic goals of war, but to combat enemy submarines, ships, and ship convoys (including aircraft carriers). They can also be used to support the operations of other types of forces: cruise missiles were just launched from such submarines against Iraq in 1991, in Yugoslavia in 1999, during the attack against Afghanistan in 2001, and during the invasions to Iraq in 2003.

The fundamental technical problem of superpowers is mobility when the concept of restricted war is realized – the ability to interfere on the place of conflict at the time. With regard to the fact that most limited wars were realized during the Cold War, in the edge of Asia and Africa, the most powerful weapon of limited wars were aircraft carriers. Today, they represent a core fleet – first, during the Cold War, it was understood as the most important part of big ship fleets in the middle of oceans; since the 90s, as the most important inshore system for combats near shore and inland. At present, the United States has 13 aircraft carriers, thereof 12 with nuclear drive. The core of these forces comprises 10 aircraft carriers of Nimitz I class (one of them should be completed in 2006). It is stated that such an aircraft carrier can strike more than 700 targets daily. It can be presupposed that the sinking of modern aircraft carrier, that is possible technically, could result in a new concept of war.

At present, it seems that conventional limited wars have appreciated the ideas of aircraft war strategists since the beginning of the century: from the bombing of Tripolis in 1986, the second war in the Gulf in 1991, up to the bombing of Serbs in Bosnia in 1995, and Iraq in September 1996, aircrafts with guided bombs and missiles, specifically with regard to aircraft carriers, have been considered to be the most significant weapons of conventional limited wars. According to Les Aspin, the allies needed several bombs to destroy a target in the Gulf War, 175 bombs in average in the Vietnam War, and 9 thousand aircraft bombs during World War II.¹ On the other hand, the evaluation of the NATO war against Yugoslavia and two campaigns of the Russian Federation forces in Chechenya, points out that there exists three important factors that have not so far allowed the generalization of ideas about the significance of aircraft in a modern limited war:

- The strategy of offensive is only usable by great powers. They can press opponents to political compromises with minimum loss of people and material for themselves. At the same time, it is apparent that the possibilities of European states to realize this strategy are only symbolic with bigger conflicts in comparison with the U.S.A.
- The results of the use of air forces against Yugoslavian army did not correspond with determine military targets. The Yugoslavian army remained operational after weeks of raids. This means that with the current standard of armament and military art, big states cannot be defeated with the strategy of aircraft war – the state that survives the strikes against infrastructure and unprotected civilian targets and can transfer combats outside its own territory.
- Political victory can be either achieved by compromising at the diplomatic table, or based on the seizure of territory with ground forces. There are different principles, as proved in the Chechnya battlefields, than the presupposed strategy of aircraft war.

This fact can also be proved by the operations in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, when the occupation of territory was required to destroy the opponent – and the keeping of this territory firstly required ground operations. These invasions also decreased the meaning of the theory of asymmetric wars that were popular at the turn of the 20th and the 21st century.

¹ KEGLEY, Charles W., Jr., WITTKOPF, Eugene R.: *World Politics. Trends and Transformation*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993, p. 456.

ries. According to some theorists, they should have become the main, if not the only form of armed combats, and they should have been made by “rouge states” and terrorists.

* * *

Despite all radical innovations that were brought by industrial and scientific revolutions to the characteristics of weapons and the methods of warfare, war remains an irrational method of conflict solution. War proves that even man at the beginning of the 21st century does not master the conditions of his life reasonably. The vision of limited wars as a technical escape from the danger of mankind's suicide in flames, radiation, and world nuclear war, has not denied the genocide aspect of wars in the 20th century. Table No. 15 states the results of William Eckhardt's research, whose time series was extended by John Rourke; in its quantitative analyses, Eckhardt defined war as the conflict in which a minimum of one thousand people died per year, and in which at least one side of the conflict was represented by a government.¹ The analyses of Eckhardt and Rourke ends in 1996, and therefore the expenses of the 20th century can even be much higher...

Table No. 15: MILITANT MILLENNIUM

CENTURY	NUMBER OF WARS	NUMBER OF DEAD IN THOUSANDS
11 th	47	57
12 th	39	129
13 th	67	410
14 th	62	501
15 th	92	878
16 th	123	1 613
17 th	113	6 108
18 th	115	7 001
19 th	164	19 423
20 th	120	111 029

With regard to the problems of acquiring exact empiric information about wars, and the conflicts about the definitions of terms, such data should be considered to be an illustrative one. However, they clearly predicate about trends that are far to be favourable for mankind: according to these data, from more than 147 million dead in the previous millennium, more than 75 % can be attributed to the 20th century. The above mentioned authors, counted almost one thousand wars from the year 1000, whereby approximately 30 % from them fall on the last two centuries. Thus, the beginning of the 20th century is full of bloody and latent conflicts, and the study of armed conflicts remain one of the most important tasks of political theory. With regard to this, there is still one unanswered question of mankind, whether it is possible to eliminate the risk of wars with the control of armament or disarmament.

20/ CONTROL OF ARMAMENT AND DISARMAMENT

¹ See ECKHARDT, W.: *Civilisations, Empires and War. A Quantitative History of War*. London: McFarland, 1992.

According to ROURKE, John T.: *International Politics of the World Stage*. (U.S.A.): Dushkin/McGraw-Hill, 1997, p. 338.

„It is much easier to make war than to ensure peace”, declared Georges Clemenceau in June 1919 in his speech in Verdun. Apart from others, this disbelief reflects the fact that the requirements for eliminating arms result from war horrors – but with no success so far. The instructions that are offered, similar to this, are very simple and effective at first sight: if there are no arms, people will have no means for warfare, and therefore there will be no wars. However, this simple logical calculation opens a complex philosophical problem related to looking for the causes of armed violence. One thing is sure: what kills is not things, but man – and not the man as a user, but the man as a creator of arms. Thus, the questions arises: does man make war because he has arms, or does man have arms, because he makes war? Peace is the happiness for all just at first sight. Again Jean Jacques Rousseau, in his book, *Meditation on Eternal Peace*, points out that the ruler does not perceive great advantages for trade that should result from general and permanent peace, because he links his happiness with privileges: “As they are (advantages) common for everybody, they are not real for anybody, because these advantages are only perceived with their differences, and because to increase his relative power, it is necessary to make efforts in order that exceptional assets might be increased.”¹

Pacifistic ideas appealing to general peace are very old. The picture of a golden age, numerous political philosophies, big religions – these all are ideological structures that comprise the elements of pacifism, and the stages of development that emphasized these elements. Already in 600 B.C., the Chinese states established a disarmament league. Also, the pressure to ban the use and manufacture of some types of arms is known from history – for example to ban the use of crossbows in combats among Catholics, the efforts to ban dum-dum bullets, and chemical weapons, were quite successful. In the 17th century, the Society of Friends, the Quakers, gave a different concept to pacifistic ideas for the change of the world. The 19th and the 20th centuries, then brought not only mass armies, but also mass peace movements. Already, in 1816, the Russian tsar proposed to restrict armament of European countries. In 1818, the American-British Treaty about the disarmament of Great Lakes was signed, whereby it is the oldest effective treaty on the demilitarization of borders about the regional disarmament. The Hague conferences and Geneva treaties represent examples of efforts to control armament and disarmament. In 1921, the United Nations succeeded in declaring a moratorium on the manufacture of weapons and in 1932, they even convened the international conference on disarmament. Remarkably different concepts met at this disarmament forum: against the British policy focused on the restriction of the establishment of armies and navies, the cancellation of general conscription, and the establishment of permanent disarmament conference, there was the French project focused on the formation of the international army from national contingents at the United Nations, and Germany required equality in armament; the Soviet delegation proposed general disarmament, and as an alternative, the proposal of treaty on proportional and graded restriction of armament.

The period closely after World War II, was linked with two big initiatives and conflicts. First, the so-called Baruch Plan that was submitted in 1946 by the United States to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission: this plan presupposed to control nuclear weapons within the framework of the United Nations, and the preservation of manufacture monopoly by the U.S.A.: the Soviet Union rejected the proposal and recommended to ban manufacture and to use nuclear weapons. The Rapacki Plan, whose first version was submitted by the Polish minister of foreign affairs to the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1957, presupposed the creation of nuclear-free zone in central Europe that would include both German states, Poland, and Czechoslovakia; this plan was rejected by both western great powers. Thus two different concepts to eliminate uncontrolled armament started to be apparent: the difference

¹ See VLČEK, Dalibor: *Medzinárodné vzťahy. Filozofické teórie vojny a mieru*. Banská Bystrica. Fakulta politických vied a medzinárodných vzťahov UMB, 2003.

between disarmament and the control of armament was profiled, and it acquired its theoretical form at the beginning of the 60s:

- **DISARMAMENT.** The idea of disarmament is based on the presumption that the liquidation of arms – or their huge reduction – means the elimination of war and military danger. Defenders of disarmament see a mutual relation between the owning of arms and war. This concept presupposes at least the partial political harmonizing of the world political system, the elimination of hostility among the actors of world policy. Deterrence as a tool of peace is not ethical and it is very risky. Disarmament as the way of power elimination from world policy means the liquidation of a system that is based on the principles of the balance of power. In this sense, disarmament represents a radical change of status quo. Peace is the slogan of disarmament.
- **RESTRICTION OF ARMAMENT AND CONTROL OF ARMAMENT.** The control of armament is focused on the fact that the spread of arms will not lead to war, destruction should be restricted and the expenses for redundant arms should result in saving. The defenders of armament control emphasize on a regular basis that there is not a direct causal relation between the owning of arms and war. The control of armament is not the harmonization of the relations of states, but the cooperation of opponents; it is not the elimination of the principles of the balance of power, but contrary to it, one of the manifestations of the balance of power policy. Deterrence is understood as ethical, because it is the safest way to peace. From this point of view, there is a level of armament, and it is dangerous to get below this level – a small change of armament then, will result in a dangerous deflection of balance. In this sense, the control of armament is often understood as the fixation of the status quo – though there are theorists and politicians that understand the control of armament as the beginning of the way to armament. Parity is the slogan of restriction and control of armament.

If we simplify this, we can say that the period after World War I. up to 1936, was associated with efforts to achieve disarmament. Contrary to this, during the years 1959 up to 1986, the approach to control armament prevailed. Thus, in the words of Michael Sheehan, *the military development in the north hemisphere stepped on the road in the direction of the both mixed approaches; the key methods of armament control were still effective, but disarmament efforts started to assert themselves.*¹ But at the beginning of the 21st century it seems that hegemonic arrangement of the world political system will require a new reasoning for the control of armament.

Disarmament

Unitarian proposals, but also the mutual proclamations and declarations related to general and complex disarmament, have not been rare during history. Practically, only some partial “disarmament” treaties have been concluded – treaties related only to some part of space or types of arms, which is practically the restriction of armament, and not true disarmament. In general, it has been possible to see advancement along two main lines:

1. Zones, where weapons are banned, specifically nuclear weapons. This line is directed against the horizontal propagation of weapons, and it relates more to treaties on non-armament than disarmament. Seven agreements can be considered as the most important at the beginning of the year 2007: the Antarctic Treaty from 1959, the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty) from 1967, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco) from the year 1967, the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nu-

¹ SHEEHAN, M.: *Arms Control and Disarmament*. In: *Encyclopedia of Government and Politics*. Vol. 2. Edited by M. Hawkesworth and M. Kogan. Vol. 1 and 2. London and New York, Routledge, 1992, p. 1266.

clear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil thereof (Seabed Treaty) from the year 1971, the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga) from the year 1985, the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok) was prepared for signing in 1995, and the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba) in 1996.

2. Liquidation of some kinds of weapons. Several achievements have been noticed in this sphere: the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, BTWC) was signed in 1972 and has been effective since 1975, the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW Convention, or 'Inhumane Weapons' Convention) was prepared for signing in 1981 and became effective two years later (the Supplement to the Convention was adopted in 2001), the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty) from the year 1987, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), signed in 1990, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (APM Convention) was signed in 1997 (the signatures, for example of the U.S.A., China, and Russia are missing).

Control of Armament

The control of armament is the activity that restricts or monitors the acquisition, location, and development of military potentials. It is a large scale of activities, whereby the control of armament can be of explicit and implicit forms, it can be based on formal or informal treaties, it can be commenced as an unilateral act, or on bilateral or multilateral bases. The defenders of this approach criticize the ideas of disarmament pointing out the negative consequences of disarmament before the start of World War II. Current arguments point out that there are difficulties in disarmament under the conditions of nuclear weapons existence – disarmament means to become a hostage of that one who breaches the treaty and will provide for a nuclear weapon unilaterally. Contrary to the pacifistic ideals of disarmament, the ideas of restriction and armament control are based on the concept that:

- weapons cannot be eliminated from social life and international policy specifically;
- weapons can fulfil a positive role in international policy not only as a tool of actual physical violence with defence, but also as a factor of deterrence, pressure diplomacy – i.e. the tool that allows a direction to peace;
- according to some ideological constructs, the control of armament is not an absolute antinomy to the ideals of armament – it can also be perceived as the first step on the road to armament.

It is possible to classify real concluded treaties on the control and the restriction of armament according to several criteria, specifically with regard to weapon's technological aspects. In general, all treaties can be divided into treaties that relate to the horizontal proliferation of weapons – the proliferation of new types of weapons among states – and treaties that relate to vertical armament – improvement, manufacture, and location of weapons in one state.

1. HORIZONTAL CONTROL

The most well known and the most important example of a multilateral treaty focused on horizontal control is the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT) that was prepared for signing in July 1968, and that has been effective since March 1970. In a sense, it is a bilateral treaty – it is a treaty signed by the great powers owning nuclear weapons and other countries not owning nuclear weapons. It is based

on three columns: (a) to not proliferate nuclear weapons, (b) to eliminate nuclear weapons, (c) the right to peaceful use of nuclear energy. According to Article I., the state-owners undertake “not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices”. According to Article II, state-owners undertake “not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”. According to Article III, each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards as set forth in the agreement concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency. According to Article IV, nothing in NPT „shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty”. All parties undertake “to facilitate, and have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy”. At the same time, the groups of owners undertake in preamble and Article VI “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” Any of the signatories can withdraw from the Treaty based on a month’s notice. As the Treaty’s duration is 25 years, the conference held to evaluate and to extend the regime of Treaty in 1995, decided to prolong its effectiveness for an unlimited period of time. In 2003, North Korea announced that they withdrew from NPT. Since 2006, together with official signatories (China, France, Russia, the U.S.A., and Great Britain), 189 countries have become parties to this Treaty. Non-official nuclear countries (India, Pakistan, and Israel) belong among states that have not signed the Treaty.¹

- **VERTICAL CONTROL**

The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (Partial Test-Ban Treaty, PTBT) is the classical example of such an agreement. It is a treaty on the partial ban of nuclear tests that was signed by Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union in 1963. However, the most well known are the bilateral treaties on strategic weapons concluded between the Soviet Union and Russia, or the United States. Table No. 16 shows the treaties regarding the restriction of strategic weapons concluded between Russia and the Soviet Union, and the U.S.A.²

Table No. 16: TREATIES ON THE RESTRICTION OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS

¹ See TEREM, Peter: *Jadrová energia v štruktúre svetových energetických zdrojov: medzinárodné súvislosti*. Zvolen: Bratia Sabovci, 2005.

² The Arms Control Association – <http://www.armscontrol.org/>

	SALT I	SALT II	START I	START II	START III	SORT
limit of located missiles	it limited missiles not warheads	it limited missiles and bombers, not warheads	6000	3000–3500	2000–2500	1700–2200
limit of located missiles	U.S.A.: 1710 ICBM and SLBM; USSR: 2347 ICBM and SLBM	2250	1600	undetermined	undetermined	undetermined
status	expired	it has never been effective	it is effective	It has never been effective	it has not been negotiated	it is signed; waiting for ratification
date of signature	26. 5. 1972	18. 6. 1979	31. 7. 1991	3. 1. 1993	undetermined	24. 5. 2002
date of effectiveness	3. 10. 1972	undetermined	5. 12. 1994	undetermined	undetermined	?
deadline of realization	undetermined	31. 12. 1981	5. 12. 2001	31. 12. 2007	31. 12. 2007	31. 12. 2012
date of expiration	3. 10. 1977	31. 12. 1985	5. 12. 2009	5. 12. 2009	undetermined	31. 12. 2012

Incongruity of Treaties

Development during the Cold War proved that the worst fears about mass proliferation of nuclear weapons and about the necessary breaking out of war due to the growth of nuclear arsenals, had not been true. Many measures were taken to prevent the breaking out of war and against the uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons. At the same time, some countries that have the economic potential to produce nuclear weapons – for example Japan, Italy, Canada, Sweden, and Germany – have repudiated these weapons. Statistics show that the tempo of nuclear weapons proliferation has decreased. Negotiations were very difficult and protracted – for example the preparation of the treaty on the partial ban of nuclear weapons only lasted several weeks, the discussions about the treaty SALT I lasted four years, the preparation of the Treaty SALT II lasted seven years and the Treaty START I was only concluded ten years after the negotiations started, but in general, it presented some conclusions that contribute to the culture of co-existence in the nuclear age.

Despite relatively small technical results, and many times accompanied with disappointment, the concluded treaties resulted in the strengthening of trust, they succeeded in establishing a new culture of armament regulation, they made the control of armament a process that has been weakened, but that generally lasts. It is based on the new knowledge of war destruction economy, the principles of deterrence and last, but not least, the new possibilities of the control of treaties fulfilment due to the revolution in military, specifically, intelligence and monitoring techniques. A functional system of the strengthening of trust with many measures has been established. The unilateral declarations of the USSR and China about not using nuclear weapons first represent an important milestone on this road. The strengthening of trust was supported by such measures as the agreement on a hot line between the leaders of the USSR and the U.S.A. from the year 1963, which were later supplemented by similar connections between Moscow, Great Britain, France, and in the end, with Beijing. The Soviet-American agreement on measures to decrease the risk of nuclear war from 1971, the treaty on preventing military incidents in international waters from the year 1972, and the French-Soviet treaty on accidental or self-willed use of nuclear weapons from the year 1976 concluded between great powers, also contributed to the building up of international political crises

management system. The principles of Stockholm Treaty from the year 1986 related to measures to decrease the danger resulting from possible surprising attacks, are focused similarly. Though the greatest achievements in disarmament in a world full of social discrepancies may help to bring peace among countries, there is still a question which has not been answered yet, “Whose peace is it?” – which of hegemony and which of class? This question can be answered, but need not be answered in the form of violent civil war. Peace is one of the forms of inter-human relations arrangement, justice, but also injustice can be its content.

On the other hand, previous experience with the process of disarmament and the control of armament is inconsistent. It is apparent that those weapons of small or no importance, were banned or reduced, because they were out of date. The efforts of nuclear weapon owners to prevent their proliferation to other states without taking into account their own programs represents a special category of armament control, i.e. something like a nuclear condominium, whereby Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons related to stopping nuclear armament race and to nuclear disarmament, was not fulfilled. The ban on nuclear tests in the atmosphere and under water appeared after it was ascertained and the techniques of underground nuclear test monitoring were improved. According to the article by Leslie Gelb published in Foreign Policy, “three decades of American-Soviet negotiations on restricting competition in armament succeeded just a little more than the codification of armament race”¹.

We can find many examples for this thesis. Let us mention the treaty on restriction of antimissile defence: with regard to the logic of deterrence functionality, it is focused on the restriction of defence against offensive missiles; it was a vulnerable system (specifically if radars are concerned) that became oversaturated and therefore ineffective with regard to the implementation of the MIRV system, it could not differentiate the real nuclear missiles from baits, it used to strike attacking ballistic missiles in the middle phase of flight, which was a disputable effectiveness, because it represented the threat of ecological catastrophe for the defenders; it is also remarkable that in the supplemented protocol, the Soviets restricted the defence of their missiles and the Americans of capital – according to their different attack strategy against forces and cities. The classical example of the incongruity of restriction and control results, is represented by the qualitative armament regarding the treaties SALT – for example, in the treaty SALT I the number of launching equipment was frozen, but the number of nuclear warheads in American strategic forces increased after this treaty from 1,710 to 7,274 in the year 1978. The success related to missiles and cruise missiles occurred deeply below the level of nuclear stalemate ensured by submarines, intercontinental ballistic missiles and aviation. The more radical restriction of strategic weapons known from the treaty, START, does not result from agreements during the period of balance, but after the factual defeat of the Soviet Union in the Cold War – and both the U.S.A. and Russia preserved their potential for a second strike. The ratification of the START II treaty, which can be considered asymmetric due to many reasons, was realized in the Russian Duma in 2000 when it became clear that many systems that according to the treaty were the subject of liquidation were out of date, and Russia did not have enough funds to modernize them, whereby many important enterprises manufacturing strategic missiles were left in Ukraine after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The treaty, SORT, also allows nuclear arsenals to be kept by the U.S.A. and Russia, and according to some calculations, these arsenals can destroy life on Earth. Furthermore, its text allows that removed nuclear warheads will not be destroyed, but stored and installed later if needed.

The fact that the U.S.A. withdrew from the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) in 2002 illustrates that some great powers are willing to withdraw

¹ According to KEGLEY, Charles W., Jr., WITTKOPF, Eugene R.: *World Politics. Trends and Transformation*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993, p. 495.

from any treaty on disarmament, or the control of armament if it is advantageous for them. The American president, George Bush, declared that the ABM treaty is a child of the Cold War relations and out of date. This statement can be explained in two ways: (a) the treaty is out of date due to technical reasons – there are new threats that must be faced in a new manner, and (b) the Soviet Union disintegrated and Russia is not the superpower with which it is necessary to negotiate about strategic balance. However, the most important question is not whether the ABM treaty from the year 1972 is backward, but in which manner it should be surpassed. The unilateral withdrawal by the U.S.A. has resulted in the fact that Russia responded in the form of asymmetric strategies that are cheaper and might be finally sufficiently effective. China intends to follow the same way. Thus the only result of the efforts for disarmament and armament control is that the United States, Russia, and China created the specialized military headquarters for cosmic wars.

* * *

At the beginning of the 21st century, the American program NMD has become the most significant test of the further orientation of disarmament and armament control. Withdrawal from this program would mean the retraction from technological and economic advantages that the United States has compared to other great powers. The development of cosmic war programs allows them to strengthen their hegemonic position.

Previous partial disarmament and armament control were within the framework of overkill – the ability of the United States and Russia to achieve multiple killing – and a decrease in the capacity of mankind's extinction from a level of sevenfold to triple means, economical saving, and simplification of control, but not a guarantee of man survival on Earth. Another philosophy is necessary to change the philosophy in the background of the treaties, SALT, START, and SORT. It seems that all important treaties of great powers on disarmament and armament control have propped themselves so far, upon the principles of the balance of power and solidarity.

21/ FUTURE OF GLOBAL POLICY

The world political system has been developing dramatically during last three centuries, but this evolution has not resulted in the elimination of basic characteristics of the Westphalia arrangement of international relations: the sovereignty of countries remains the core of international policy, legal norms do not cover all activities of countries, all-embracing institutions to enforce law, to mediate and to settle disputes; mutual dependence of countries is on such a low level that war has not been eliminated. In this situation, history only offers two tools to stabilize the system, where power balance governs, in medium-term Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty):

- The multi-polar balance of power between countries or coalitions. In the multipolar form – known from the period of European Concert – the balance of power represented a semi-spontaneous mechanism of security relations that could not guarantee any automatic solution of conflicts between countries without the use of war. Bipolarity also cannot guarantee any wars – e.g. during the Cold War, it connected the balance of power with semi-spontaneity with calculable deterrence; this resulted in relatively high amount of expenses and “peace” between superpowers full of crises and conflicts, including armed conflicts in “periphery” areas.

- A unipolar arrangement with the dominance of one hegemon, or central coalition. This solution was very frequent during regional history – from the Roman Peace, the status of China in the East Asia, and up to the Monroe Doctrine. It need not only have the form of one political unit leading status: it can be executed by the condominium of main great powers, as it happened during the period of Saint Alliance. Such a condominium can be based not only on mutual responsibility, involvement, and ideological unison, but also on the rejecting of territorial expansion and the priority of economic development.

During the whole period of military evolution, modern nations and states could achieve more prosperity through the growth of their economic effectiveness, cooperation, and international division of labour than through war, imperialism and the exclusive spheres of influence. It was just the period of industrial and scientific revolution that showed that technical development itself is not a sufficient reason for states to abandon their egoistic power interests – the fight of states and their coalitions to achieve unilateral advantages had been persisting, though not always by classical methods. Today, the world has only advanced from the Cold War to “warm peace”: Table No. 17 shows their occurrence during the period of time. According to the analysis of SIPRI, from the end of the Cold War until 2005, a total of 57 significant armed conflicts occurred, whereby most of them relate to governing, and less to territory. Graph No. 4 shows the distribution of these conflicts according to regions, and it is apparent that most conflicts occurred in the developing world during the period that was the subject of research. In 2005, according to SIPRI, there was no interstate conflict, but it is an issue of the definition of foreign participation in civil war.¹ During the period after the Cold War, other states were also involved politically, economically, or directly militarily, in all interstate conflicts.


Table No. 17: MAIN ARMED CONFLICTS DURING 1990 – 2005

1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
30	31	27	29	29	27	23	19

1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005
26	25	23	22	20	20	19	17

Graph No. 4: REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF MAIN CONFLICTS

¹ SIPRI Yearbook 2006. *Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2006, p. 110–111.



The end of the Cold War brought a romantic hope for a revolutionary change in the world political system; the expectations that the states would stop behaving according to the principles of the balance of power. The similar feelings of radical changes were typical for any, specifically hegemonic, war – after the Russian- French War, after World War I, and also after World War II, but only for a short period of time. The hopes were not confirmed by history, which does not mean that this hope did not exist as a possibility : what about if it was real, but it was wasted? And, there are really many news. After the meetings of “diplomacy – treaties – law”, the formation of the world policy modern regime has proceeded. The globalization of economics has deepened, and thus we can speak about qualitative changes. Furthermore, the destructive force of strategic weapons is not only so big, but also so known that it itself decreases the danger of war. The new technical possibilities of intelligence and the monitoring of keeping treaties, that have impact upon governments and the public, have been invented. There is also the change of the structure of the world political system: the unipolar arrangement with the hegemonic status of the U.S.A.

However, the end of Cold War has an asymmetric impact upon various countries and regions. There is an unequal distribution of security and economic advantages of newly formed structure, the cultural differences remained and the possibilities of propaganda are in the hands of the most powerful ones. The enlargement of NATO to the east indicates that the policy of the balance of power has not disappeared from international politics, the power balance was just diverted in favour of NATO, to the detriment of the Russian Federation. The original ideas about the transfer of resources of developed countries used during the Cold War, for armament in favour of developing countries, proved to be unreal – the decrease in expenses for armament is also accompanied by the increase in the power that was motivated by bipolar competition to a large extent. The unipolar arrangement not only simplified the world: the Cold War was offering and requiring relatively simple scenarios; today, this policy requires a whole set of overlapping scenarios, whereby many of them can be applicable at the same time and in the same region.

The realistic, or geopolitical visions of eternal conflicts, offer various pictures of the future. Is the conflict of civilization, that is so colourfully described by Samuel Huntington, awaiting the world? ¹ If so, the 21 milliard Christians and 1.3 milliard Muslims (940 million of Sunnis look for a common language with 120 million of Shias), of Huntington’s world,

¹ See HUNTINGTON. Samuel P.: *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996, p. 313–314.

could be confronted. Or 1.1 milliard Catholics, almost 370 million Protestants, and 79 million Anglicans, could oppose 128 million Orthodox Christians. Furthermore, there is also 851 million Hindus, 375 million Buddhists, 25 million Sikhs, 15 million Jews – as well as 6 million Confucians (however, in China, there are 402 million traditional religion worshippers, 110 million Buddhists, 3 million Taoists). Moreover, in this mix of civilizations, there are 767 million heathens and 151 million atheists.¹ In other words, in accordance with the line of national states: according to the calculations of the American expert for the problems of borders, Paul Huth, at the end of the 20th century, from 309 existing borders, 52 were the subject of conflicts (i.e. 17 %); from existing 425 sea borders, only approximately 160 (38 %) were officially delimited and 39 countries were in conflict because of the 33 islands of the archipelagos.² And we could go on like this. However, such a world has only limited hopes for survival.

However, the above mentioned scenarios do not represent the only possibility for the world. Theoretical concepts dispute about the interpretation of development tendencies, whereby the current situation offers arguments almost in favour of each of them. The basic institutions of western modernity – national state, industrialism, and capitalism – have become global. It is obvious that capitalism represents the basic framework for the relations among countries in the world community – which corresponds with the vision of the theory of independence about the injustice of the basic states and regions. Thought, more and more attempts appear on different solutions, as for example Islamic fundamentalism, or socialism, in fact Muslim countries as well as China are fatally included in globalization. And this current image of globalization still comprises capitalistic and mainly U.S. “genetic code”.

The existence of national states and capitalistic social arrangement is linked with anarchy, as an uncooperative game, in which promises do not mean obligations, and actions are based on selfish interest. This currently means that the hegemonic arrangement of the world political structure does not mean the overcoming of the mechanism of security dilemma, armament, trade with arms, and wars. These all corresponds with the ideas of a realistic paradigm. However, the significance of international organizations and norms increases in the current world, the regime of international policy is being formed, the decentralization of foreign policy with regard to the increase in the importance of so-called “small policy” is being realized – which corresponds with the visions of the theory of complex mutual dependence. In this situation, political theory as the whole is able to describe the current situation, but it cannot say where the development is directed – its answers are contradictory either due to different methodological approaches and the priority of focus on different problems, or due to various experience and ideological prejudices of their authors. Theory can only offer hypotheses within the traditional scale of realism – idealisms, with the additional remark that the confrontation today could have more tragic consequences than in the past, which is a threat speaking in favour of development stability.

States and national societies are not equal in the present world. There exists a division in the economic hierarchy of poor countries and rich countries and regions, there exists a hierarchy according to resource dividing the countries into importers and exporters, there is the political hierarchy for the line of relations “the governing and the controlled”, and of course, there persists also the military hierarchy dividing countries and their alliances into the strong ones and the weak ones. After the defeat of Napoleon, the development of the world political system structure was directed from multipolarity, through bipolarity, to hegemonic arrangement. The current world political system has a hierarchically arranged structure with the exceptional position of the U.S.A.: the United States of America is a hegemon. The legitimacy of the U.S.A.’s status today – similarly as the status of the legitimacy of any other hegemon in

¹ See *The World Almanac and Book of Facts 2006*. Mahwah: St. Martin’s Press, 2006, p. 721.

² According to ENRIQUEZ, J.: *Too Many Flags?* In: *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1999, p. 44-45.

this hierarchy – is related to the general recognition of their position at the top of power pyramid that is based on three facts:

- 1) The hegemonic position of great powers result from victory in the last hegemonic war that demonstrated its competence to enforce its will. In case of the United States status, it relates to the defeat of the Soviet Union and its allies in the Cold War;
- 2) The hegemonic position results from the ability to provide publicly needed goods, first of all, the advantageous economic order and relatively stable structure of the world political system. In case of the U.S.A. position, this relates to the ability:
 - a) to be the dominant economic power. Though it is said that there is a relative economic decline in the United States (in 1950, its GNP comprised 35 % of world production), the U.S.A. is still:
 - i) economically the strongest country with regard to production: in 2005, a share of the U.S.A. in world gross domestic product was 20.1 %. In comparison with China, the economy that was the second strongest, it only produced 15.4 % of the gross world product, the Eurozone 14.8 %.¹ Dollar, though shaken, still remain the most important currency. The U.S.A. is the home country strategically for the most significant companies. The United States still keeps the top position in the production of advance technologies (computers, biotechnologies, etc.). The world communication networks, databases, and the use of space, is in American ownership, or controlled by the U.S.A.
 - ii) the key core of scientific and technical innovations during the period when the innovations represent the key power. At the time of the information revolution, in the United States there were most research centres and universities, it was here where most scientific findings were born. The most important military research is also realized in the U.S.A. The proposal for the budget for the US Department of Defense in 2007, for military research and development, tests and evaluation, is in the amount of USD 89.7 milliard² – approximately 2.7 more than, according to SIPRI, Germany spends for defence as the whole, and more than twice than China spends for its total military expenses.

Though for example in the Middle East, the occupation of territory still represents the guarantee of status and country security due to various reasons, in general it is applicable that due to scientific and technical revolution, the access to resources and their control is of the same importance as their occupation. The relative decrease in the economic importance of the U.S.A. is paradoxically compensated by the increasing importance of the economy in international policy: the role of the United States remains unreplaceable and it is more needed at present. All the other great powers that are mentioned as the competitors of the U.S.A., have only acquired a partial or leading domination, and only in some selected spheres.

- b) the armed forces of the U.S.A., either missiles, or classical ones, are the biggest forces, either with regard to capacity, or to mobility. The United States, as the only superpower, preserves a worldwide network of military bases; data of the US Department of Defense about the changes in the location of American soldiers abroad during twenty years until 2005 are shown in Table No. 18.³ At the same time, the US military expenses are almost twice as high as the total remaining four permanent members of the UN Security Council, i.e. China, Great Britain, France, and Russia, plus Germany, Japan, and India. The military expenses of the U.S.A. comprise almost four

¹ *World Economic Outlook. April 2006. Globalization and Inflation.* Washington: International Monetary Fund, 2006, p. 170.

² U. P. Department of Defense – <http://www.defenselink.mil/>

³ Worldwide Manpower Distribution, U. P. Department of Defense – <http://web1.whs.osd.mil/mmid/pubs.htm#M05> and *The World Almanac and Book of Facts 2006.* Mahwah: St. Martin's Press, 2006, p. 74.

percent of GNP, which proves a persisting effort to keep military domination. This is applicable during the period, when the official strategy of the U.S.A. includes the determination to use military forces in international relations preventively, and also to enforce ideological goals. The above mentioned proves that today, armed forces are more understood as a tool for enforcement rather than deterrence – whereby the U.S.A. does not only consider activities within the framework of the United Nations.

Table No. 18: AMERICAN MILITARY PERSONNEL ABROAD (1985–2005)

REGION AND CHOSEN COUNTRY	1985	1995	2005
Total military personnel of the U.S.A.	2 151 032	1 518 224	1 390 765
The U.S.A. and special places	1 635 665	1 280 160	1 112 684
Hawaii	46 875	38 172	33 343
Guam	9 216	5 509	3 384
Temporary locations	61 966	36 843	48 759
On ships	161 013	138 187	109 119
The other countries of the western hemisphere	18 858	17 132	1 978
Europe	357 535	118 162	105 570
Germany	246 875	73 280	69 395
Great Britain	29 532	12 131	11 093
Italy	14 695	12 007	12 258
Serbia (Kosovo)	-	13	1 749
Bosnia and Herzegovina	-	1	265
On ships	35 927	7 803	1 919
The former Soviet Union	-	87	158
The Far East and the Pacific	125 025	89 306	80 755
Japan	46 923	39 134	35 307
South Korea	41 718	36 016	32 744
Philippines	15 374	126	95
On ships	19 918	13 241	11 618
North Africa, Near East and South Asia	13 192	8 814	175 463
Iraq	8	-	169 200 ^{x/}
Afghanistan	6	-	Non-stated
Diego Garcia	1 242	897	986
On ships	9 161	4 053	2 298
Sub-Saharan Africa	-	3 425	448

x/ including supportive troops in neighbouring countries.

3) The hegemonic status results from the ability to offer ideological values justifying as a new order. In the case of today's U.S.A., it is not only the distinctive conglomerate of liberal-conservative ideology, but also the propagandistic capacity given by cultural- informational content of various mass media, starting from scientific journals up to Hollywood, but also by the use of global communication network, starting from CNN up to the Internet. The United States is the successors of Great Britain in pushing ahead English as the language of world communication.

Such a legitimacy of the hegemonic status has naturally only little in common with abstractly perceived justice; it is based on political and not on legal recognition. Besides, it is applicable for all countries that though they look for justice, they very seldom achieve no more than the protection of their own interests. The current situation does not represent a swing from history: it is only a traditional power balance that can be – and it will be during the course of time – transferred either through traditional, or radical change.

Traditional change of structure

The beginning of the 21st century was typical for increasing mistrust between the power centres of the world. The enlargement of NATO, the bombing of Yugoslavia, the disputes related to the American program of National Missile Defense, and mainly the intervention in Iraq, point out that there is a little understanding for foreign interests in world policy. It also a reminder that the substance of foreign policy resists empathy, the abilities (but sometimes also possibilities) to empathy with feelings, opinions, and motives of other statesmen. The U.S.A., with many acts of their politicians ad in the works of such theorists as Robert Gilpin, Samuel Huntington, Henry Kissinger, Robert Kagan, Zbigniew Brzezinski and many others, try not to only look for ways of keeping their hegemony, but also its strengthening – though they very often differ in their opinions on the advancement of government. The United States does not live through the crisis of definite will. The current official line of viewing the world is represented by the opinions of Condoleezza Rice, the secretary of state. Already before the current President assumed powers, she wrote, *the United States and their allies are on the right side of history*, and the U.S.A. is *the only guarantor of global peace and stability* – and therefore, *military preparation will hold the central position in the world of the US government ... technological dominance must be used for the building up of forces that are lighter and more lethal, more mobile, and more flexible, and able to strike exactly to a large distance.*¹ Furthermore, the National Security Strategy of the United States of America – both versions from 2002 as well as 2006 – added the thesis about possible unilateral activities and the preventive war regardless of international law. However, the hegemonic arrangement always tends to unify the periphery. The U.S. use of hegemony resulted in the call of the European Union, Russia, China, India, and some other Muslim countries, for multipolarity. This requirement is supported by too small power potential at the beginning of the 21st century, and it may never be listened to, but anyway it still remains to be the traditional way for the change of structure to doubt the hegemonic status of the U.S.A. by another country or an alliance.

It is remarkable that at the beginning of the 21st century returns the importance of cultural-geopolitical regions-independent political units from the beginning of world political system globalization in the 15th and the 16th centuries; the only novelty is the significance of North America. However, not anyone from these regions has the potential to threaten the hegemony of the U.S.A. The distribution of forces and the tendency of further development of existing power centres point out that the classical change of the structure of the world political system might occur during the first two or three decades of the 21st century due to certain solutions of four vital questions at present – whether the development of China will not be linked with doubting the hegemonic role of the U.S.A., whether the status of hegemony will not be doubted by the confrontation with the Muslim world, what is the future of Russia, and whether the United States will not sink into internal crisis.

DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA


Four main factors prove that the future belongs to China: a) geographical size, b) demographical potential, c) raw material base, and c) economic dynamics. The area of China is similar to the U.S.A. China is the most populous country, and if dislodged from this position by India, it has 4.7 times more inhabitants than the U.S.A. China has been developing the fastest for more than two decades, and according to qualified estimates, its GNP should exceed the U.S.A.'s GNP after the year 2020. However, the imposing development programs of China do not include such modernization of an army that could make China the power competitor of the U.S.A. in the future generation. Though China is the second strongest economy of the world, they only spend 1/10 of the U.S.A. expenses for the military. Graph No. 5 shows the estimated expenses of China for military according to the analysts of the US intelligence until 2025 ;² according to it, China will not threaten the U.S.A. militarily in the medium-term

¹ RICE, C.: *Promoting the National Interest*. In: Foreign Affairs, 2000/1, p. 46, 50 and 51.

² *Mapping of the Global Future. Report of the National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project*. Washington: NIC, 2004, p. 51.

horizon. Furthermore, the introvert tradition of Chinese foreign policy proves that China will not be a destabilizing actor of the structure of the world political system in the near future. However, the continuing globalization of the economy will probably result in the further increase of the importance of the Pacific region (to which the U.S.A. also belongs), and including the increasing role of China.

Chart No. 5: PROGNOSIS OF CHINA'S MILITARY EXPENSES (2003-2025)
(in milliards of USD according to value in 2003)



CONFRONTATION WITH MUSLIMS

Today, the radical branches of Muslims represent ideology and religion that, as the only ones, demand the fundamental change of the world political system. The integrating element of this anti-Western power potential is the affiliation of the Arabic world to a certain extent, but in this case, the ethnical affiliation and language are not the base of political organization – religion is the decisive criterion for the determination of community. However, the picture of the united Arabic or Muslim world has been a model picture so far: the Arabic countries differ with their internal arrangement and disputes among the individual branches of Islam, specifically the Sunni and the Shia Muslims, are quite sharp. During the last decades, more Muslims died during the various armed conflicts among Muslims than between Muslims and other concessions.

Being frustrated with their power decline during the last two hundred years that is contradictory to the raw material wealth of many Muslim countries, but also with the arrogance and cultural aggressiveness of the Christian-Jewish world, the Islam loudly offers an alternative for the current liberal social and political arrangement. Contrary to Marxism, today it shows determination as well as the partial potential for its enforcement. The revolution in Iran and the war in Afghanistan started a new confrontation phase. However, this potential is being born more than what is at the disposal. The upbringing of the fundamentalists in the belt from Algeria to Sin-tiang and Philippines has strengthened the terrorist activities of urban and rural guerrillas so far, but during the next two decades it can result in the establishment of other theocratic states; then, they could establish a significant alliance against the hegemony of the U.S.A. This power formation could be of great importance if it succeeds in presenting itself as a defender of the interests of the world periphery at confrontation with the world centre: then, the social- economic bipolarity of the North and the South would change into the political

bipolarity. In general it can be said that potential of the Muslim radicals and extremists with regard to the fight with the hegemonic status of the U.S.A. is weaker than the Chinese one, but more dynamic in its confrontation efforts.

POSSIBILITIES OF RUSSIA

Today, Russia as a prospective rival in the competition for the status of hegemony, manifests the faithfulness to liberal values offered mainly by the United States, and the Russian elite, with its internal political social-economic programs, is depending on the U.S.A. and its closest allies to a large extent. However, the way of solving problems at the Balkans showed Russia that it must rely on itself first of all; after Vladimir Putin became the President, Russia started to consolidate its statehood and to renew its strength. Russia is still comparable in the sphere of strategic weapons – it has preserved the ability of the second strike. On the other hand, there is no possibility of deducing economic power from the strength of strategic weapons. The economic power is the basic source of acquiring allies in the globalizing world and thus to doubt the existing hegemony of the U.S.A. The Russian economy, after its catastrophic economic fall at the end of perestroika, and after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, only comprised 2.6 % of the world production in 2005, i.e. less than 1/9 of the U.S.A.'s share.¹ The number of inhabitants dropped to the sixth place – whereby statisticians announced the decrease.

However, the Russian Federation is still the largest country in the world, and it belongs among the most important raw material bases. Its significance has been increasing with regard to the energy security of Europe, and other countries as well. Russia still remains the innovation centre that is able to compete with the U.S.A. in the research and development of new weapons – which is also confirmed by the quoted analyses of SIPRI, according to which Russia reached the first place in exporting weapons at the beginning of the 21st century. According to the calculations of analysts of the investment company, Goldman Sachs, Russia should be economically the strongest country in 2027 in Europe. However, Russia has slumped from the status of superpower to the level of regional great power, but it has reaches in the most sensitive parts of the world – the Pacific and Europe – with its “regional” interests. The alternative transfer of Russia to the role of the U.S. competitor is not possible during a short period of time. Russia can become a strategic competitor of the United States under two conditions: a) if Russia succeeds in accelerating its economy without any dependence on raw material export, and b) if Russia acquires significant allies geopolitically.

INTERNAL CRISIS OF THE U.S.A.

The fact that the United States is the hegemony of the world political system does not mean that they will play this role successfully. The keeping of the system of hegemonic stability means, for the U.S.A., to ensure satisfactory solution, or to inhibit world political, economic, ecological, and demographic crises. The pyramid of the U.S.A.'s obligations, resulting from unipolar responsibility, is so huge that the United States cannot solve it alone and therefore they ask their allies for help: thus the complex community originates with the network of obligations, some concentric circles according to the type of responsibility. With their 296 million inhabitants, they comprise approximately 4.5 % of all mankind over which they execute their hegemonic patronage. Unless they should be depleted, which is a classical way to decline a hegemonist, they depend on their allies. The invasions against Iraq and Afghanistan, Haiti, and the territory of former Yugoslavia, show the strength of hegemon; the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan after their military occupation, the failure of the operation in Somalia, point out the restrictions of some unmilitary factors of the U.S.A. power; the ignoring of the tragedy in Rwanda, Sri Lanka, or Algeria, represent the examples of current arrangement

¹ *World Economic Outlook. April 2006. Globalization and Inflation.* Washington: International Monetary Fund, 2006, p. 170.

weaknesses. It is not the problem that these conflicts originated, but the fact that the current arrangement of the world community has not sufficient moral, institutional, and economic potentials for their solutions.

As far as the medium-term horizon is concerned, the status of the United States, as the world hegemon, will be specifically endangered in two domestic factors: a) low predictability of the possible consequences of such phenomena as budget deficit and internal debt, and b) counterproductive foreign policy strategy. According to tables published by the U.S. President's Office at the beginning of 2006, the U.S.A. in the fiscal year 2000 showed the budget surplus in the amount of 236.2 milliard, but the estimated deficit for the fiscal year 2006 was USD 423.2 milliard. The debt of public finance increased from 533.2 milliard in 1975 (2475 dollars per capita) to 7.4 billion (26 832 dollars per capita) in 2006.¹

The neoconservatives and the offensive realists that are in the background of the US foreign policy doctrine formulation at the beginning of the 21st century, often determine ideological goals that do not take into account the rational analysis. At the same time, they bet on the power dominance and they believe in the creative strength of war. It results in the loss of allies for the most risky activities and the execution of the type of activities as the intervention to Iraq that extensively loads American economy – for example, the laureate of the Nobel Prize, Joseph Stiglitz, from Columbia University, and the budget expert, Linda Bilmes, from Harvard University, calculate that the price for the war in Iraq will be from USD 1026 milliard up to 2239 milliard.² At the same time, the interventions of this type extends to the number of the US policy opponents. The uncooperative negotiations of the U.S. represent pressure on the enlargement and the deepening of the integration of such organizations as Shanghai Cooperation Organization. This can only result in nothing else than the weakening of the U.S.A. hegemonic status.

The European Union, and Japan, besides China – the biggest non-American economic centres, but with their economic and military-political obligations- represent long-term allies of the U.S.A., not its strategic competitors. However, the disputes related to the American practice of hegemonic policy and the requirement of the European Union, specifically France and Germany, for the effective multilateralism, but also the discussion regarding the independent armed forces of the EU, point out that there are also centrifugal forces among the allies of the U.S.A. The confrontation of the interests of the South and the North has not had a political dimension so far – the South is not united, organized, and therefore not leaded in its interest.

In a certain sense, the arrangement of the world after the Cold War can be considered to be the unwritten “treaty” concluded between the U.S.A. and the other power centres, with the exception of the Muslim world, on the hegemonic shape of the structure of the world political system and obligations resulting from it. The duration of such treaties was approximately ten years during the classical period of the Westphalian system. The interconnections of anti-hegemonic aspirations represent the most significant manifestation of current system crisis: the radicalization of Chinese and Indian foreign policies, the success of Muslim fundamentalists, the isolationism of the European Union and the subsequent mobilization of Russia – which as the total could necessarily result in the erosion of the status of the United States as a hegemon. Though such situation is possible as a model, but it is not very probable; the most probable starting point could be the deep interpolitical crisis of the U.S.A. that would undermine the will and the economy of this superpower.

Revolutionary changes of structure

¹ The White House – <http://www.whitehouse.gov/>

² STIGLITZ Joseph E., BILMES, Linda: *The Economic Costs of the Iraq War: An Appraisal Three Years After the Beginning of the Conflict*. Studie pro konferenci The Allied Social Sciences Association. Leden 2006, p. 30.

The elimination of the U.S.A.'s hegemony can also be imagined as a radical change of the world policy based on the creation of a new world political system not only without a hegemony, but also without a balance of power – i.e. the origination of a new world state. According to traditional measures, this goal can be considered idealistic, but it can be fulfilled with realistic techniques and with justified realistic arguments: (a) self-preservation associated with knowledge of the previous fate of every hegemony will show the U.S.A. the insufficiency of their potential to keep the stability of the current system arrangement, and (b) the other power centres – specifically the European Union, Japan, Russia, and maybe the Muslim world, will start to understand the danger of military confrontation and the overall economic destabilization. Then the world political system could be gradually transformed on a confederative base.

The changes of the conditions of the world political system stability also result from globalization on Earth. It is not only realized along the economic line – it is inseparable from global problems. The mutual fated dependence can also be defined according to nuclear threat. It does not only relate to the disclosed arsenals of nuclear great powers: the Chernobyl catastrophe in 1986 clearly illustrated that any country on the territory of which the nuclear power plant is situated is a passive nuclear power. The various environmental analyses point out that mankind can be endangered with the enlargement of the ozone hole. Ecologists warn that deforestation means the destruction of forests in an area of more than 300 thousand km² per year – which is a territory comparable, for example, to Poland. The epidemic of AIDS's type of diseases seem to be uncontrollable by one state or coalition, etc. The surviving of mankind requires increased cooperation. It is just the pressure of global problems together with the increasing awareness of ensuring sustainable development that could, under some conditions, represent a source of the world political system reorganization.

Cooperation has always been – as a similar conflict – present in international policy. Its basic problem has been that after some time, the unequal development of power potentials, doubted advantages of cooperative arrangement, and subsequent conflict – sometimes in the form of war – resulted in the discontinuity of cooperation. At present, the formation of the informative, social, and military networks of mutually dependent international organizations – though built up with regard to the hegemonic character of stability so far, – could provide cooperation with a new depth and continual shape. At the beginning of the 90s, such realist as Richard Rosecrance presupposed that if the main economic centres cooperated in keeping the stability of the system during ten years, this arrangement could be permanent: "As soon as the strong central group consolidates, the others will not try to establish the balance against it; they will be attracted to its core. Thus, in this way, China will become the member of Agreement, and then the third world will follow. Despite of historical precedents, the central coalition need not collapse this time."¹ At the beginning of the 21st century, it seems that this calculation adjudged mankind for another confrontation. However, there is no reason why it would not be possible to prolong this deadline, or to determine a new date after partial confrontations.

None of the lines along which the division of mankind is realized, need not necessarily be fatal for the existence of mankind. This is also applicable for the existence of various civilizations that are currently the most frequently stated as the cause of future wars and conflicts. However, the differences of civilizations can become the source of political disputes if they bring into them the elements of ideology – only under the conditions that the vision of these differences become part of conflict oriented values, according to which political decision making is realized. Only if the idea of the necessity of one cultural and value framework governing the others wins, the difference of cultures becomes the source of conflict. The differences of civilization in the sense of cultural-political values need not be a difference of civili-

¹ ROSECANCE, R.: *Nová jednota mezi velmocemi*. In: Spektrum, 83/1993, p. 8.

zation and barbarianism. The question arises of how is one civilization able to understand the other. According to Irina Vasilenko, the requirement for the “humanization of political dialogue” becomes important. Such humanistic dialogue of civilizations enriches all partners, because it does not understand the others as the limits of its possibilities, but as their extending. “Such presumption allow some civilization to overcome own socio-cultural egocentrism... The other civilization becomes interesting and valuable just thanks to its peculiarities and differences...”¹ Different civilizations can live next one another, to enrich mutually, to overlap naturally.

However, it does not mean that all political controversies can disappear. Conflicts persist, but they acquire a new form. The Cold War was not made for a territory, wealth, or trade, but for a regime. Today, the great powers do not claim any territory from one another (apart from the Japanese requirement related to the Kuril Islands); all great powers look for power advantages mainly through economic development. In order that cooperation relations might prevail confrontation relations permanently, at least at the highest level of policy – in security relations of great powers – the issues of life global quality should replace war, the central topic of foreign policy. In other words, under the pressure of a system and the public, the statesmen should be forced to perceive the traditional issues of security policy under the angle of view of danger resulting from global chaos: the awareness of social unity should precede the political unity. The environmental vision of united planetary policy directed to ensuring natural balance and the global interests of mankind in the form of sustainable development would have to replace the selfishness of state interests and statesmen. Such transformation also presupposes the change of many institutions that are not always deservedly understood as integrative, because they have brought the issues of a new type so far – the UN is imperfect, gigantic corporations strengthen the asymmetry of dependence, they pollute environment, and create the culture of spiritless consumption, world universities organize research to preserve this condition, organized churches seek how to divide worshippers, etc.

* * *

The fate of mankind has not been decided so far. The retreat of Marxism-Leninism does not mean the end of ideological confrontation: the democratic vision of cosmopolitan and peace with social justice is opposed with conservatism and nationalism and extremists professing big institutionalized religions. However, the stability of global civilization means more than the preservation of the current characteristics of the system. From the humanistic point of view, it is necessary to consider continuous change to be stability that would not mean the menace for the vital interests of privileged great powers, and at the same time it would be the transformation of hegemonic arrangement into condominium and consecutively into the world state. However, neither the fulfilment of this great goal means the achievement of peace and justice. Peace is not only a cease-fire, peace is a social term. The future is not the only one – the future exists in variants.

¹ VASILENKO, Irina A.: *Političeskaja globalistika*. Moskva: Logos, 2000, p. 328–329.

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